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The effects of ionizing radiation on semiconductors are under study since the in-
vention of the bipolar transistor back in 1947. Outer space is a harsh radiation
environment as showed by the first orbiting artificial satellites. It was during the
space race in the 50’s, when the study of induced errors in critical electronic com-
ponentes underwent an important impulse. The need for robust electronics against
radiation has been always present in the aerospace sector. Nowadays, the trend in
industry towards scale down semiconductor technologies is bringing these con-
cerns down to the electronic equipments operating at sea level. Modern nano-
scale technologies are challenging designers to develop new and more efficient
hardening techniques to guarantee reliability in electronic components for critical
systems in civil aviation, automotive or nuclear energy industries, for example.
• Research activities within the group the author belongs in the field of Single
Event Effects (SEE) on electronic devices, unveiled the necessity to estab-
lish a methodology to diagnose errors observed on electronic components
when put under ionizing radiation. Generally, it becomes very difficult to
correlate with certainty the observed errors to the internal faults. Further-
more, complexity inherent to the instrumentation in a particle accelerator
radiation test, added to the own design complexity of the device under test
(DUT), require some kind of criterion for the validation of observed errors
that can be of diverse nature (dose damage, physical damage or even sig-
nal integrity issues). Obtaining cross section curves for SEE (Single Event
Effects) is the common way to represent experimental results from radia-
tion tests. This curves represent a collection of experimental data that have
to be previously carefully classified. The same is valid in tests addressed
to evaluate Real Time Soft Error Rates (RTSER). Regarding error classi-
fication, the standard JEDEC JESD89-1A recommends to follow a “failure
criteria” for proper identification of detected errors at the outputs of a circuit
in radiation tests. A validation method is required. This thesis introduces a
methodology which contributes to the identification of observed errors for
proper validation of the experimental results.
xi
Abstract
• The radiation effects research group based at the Department of Electronics
Engineering of the University of Seville have a contrasted experience in the
use of hardware emulators for early evaluation of robustness against soft
errors in digital designs. Hardware emulation platforms are used to inject
faults in the netlist of a digital design in order to study the evolution of the
logic state of the circuit under operation. The main advantage in comparison
to simulation techniques is in hardware acceleration, allowing fast execution
of massive fault injection campaigns. Massive or systematic fault injection
campaigns allow to check exhaustively the response of a digital circuit in a
harsh radiation environment. These campaigns produce a lot of information
on the vulnerabilities of the design. This data must be processed statisti-
cally. The availability to correlate the clock cycle for fault injection and the
corresponding target register with the associated response would be very
valuable to establish the cause of observed errors during a beam test, where
only outputs are monitored. The main contribution of this thesis is in the
detection and diagnosis of soft errors appearing in radiation experiments.
• Results from an injection campaign depend on the DUT, but also on the
set of applied stimuli or workload. The results from a massive injection
campaign can be used to perform a statistical analysis about the quality of
the test vectors for diagnosis. It is expected that different faults share the
same failure pattern (signature) at the outputs so it’d become impossible to
determine the cause of the observed error in a radiation experiment. In the
setup of a radiation experiment it is recommendable to consider a set of test
vectors that minimize the aliasing in diagnosis. The methodology developed
in this thesis definitely contributes to this point, introducing a figure of merit
for the quality of the set of test vectors.
The work described in this thesis is aimed at establishing a methodology to
obtain a dictionary of faults where a connection exists between a well known
internal fault and the circuit’s response coded in a signature of few bytes. In a
radiation test, these signatures can be recorded in real time to identify the origin
of the damage by means of the fault dictionary, generated by exhaustive fault
injection in a hardware emulator. In case the signature is not present in the fault
dictionary, it can be stated that the observed error was not generated by a fault like
the modeled for the dictionary generation. The origin of the error can be a different
type of SEE or an error of different nature, for example physical damage.
The thesis culminates with a radiation test in a particle accelerator. The Univer-
sity of Seville hosts the facilities of the National Accelerators Center, in particular
the Tandem Van der Graaf Linear accelerator, which has proven to be an excel-
lent testbench for the validation of the error detection and diagnosis methodology






1.1 Electronics and Ionizing Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2 Radiation Effects on Semiconductors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.2.1 Activation by Nuclear Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.2.2 Displacement Damage Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.2.3 Total Ionizing Dose . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.2.4 Single-Event Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.3 Hardness Assurance Against Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.4 Fault Injection Techniques for Digital Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.4.1 Hardware-Based Fault Injection: HWFI . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.4.2 Software-Based Fault Injection: SWFI . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.4.3 Simulation-Based Fault Injection: SBFI . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.4.4 Hybrid Techniques: Hardware Emulation . . . . . . . . . 39
1.5 Hardware Emulators for Fault Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.5.1 Instrumented Fault Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.5.1.1 Emulation Systems Depending on a Host . . . . 41
1.5.1.2 Autonomous Emulation System . . . . . . . . . 43
1.5.2 Fault Injection by Reconfiguration . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.6 Revision of FT-UNSHADES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.6.1 Basic Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.6.2 Injection Run . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
1.7 Scope of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2 Soft Error Testing 53
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.2 SEE Computer Simulation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.2.1 SPICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
xiii
Table of Contents
2.2.2 SRIM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.2.3 TCAD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.3 Radiation Testing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.3.1 Cross-Sections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.3.2 Proton Beams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.3.3 Neutron Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.3.4 Pulsed Laser Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.3.5 Ion Beams . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
2.3.5.1 Broad Beam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.3.5.2 Microprobe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.4 Proposed Methodology for Soft Error Testing . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.5 Remarks on This Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
3 Signature Analysis 69
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.2 Use of Signature Analysis for Soft Error Testing . . . . . . . . . . 71
3.3 Signature Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.4 Hash Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.5 Fowler-Noll-Vo Versus RIPEMD160 Hash Functions . . . . . . . 76
3.5.1 Implementation on an FPGA Device . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.5.2 Pros and Cons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.6 Remarks on This Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4 Fault Injection Campaigns 83
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2 Beam Test Mode of Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.3 Fault Dictionary Generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3.1 SEU Dictionaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3.2 SET Dictionaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.3.3 MBU Dictionaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.4 Workload Suitability for Fault Diagnosis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.5 Remarks on This Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
5 Experiment at the Particle Accelerator 97
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
5.2 Automatic Test Equipment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
5.3 Microbeam Chamber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.4 Vehicle Under Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
5.5 Signal Integrity Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.5.1 Emulator-Side Voltage Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
5.5.2 DUT-Side Voltage Translation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
xiv
Table of Contents
5.6 Projectile Selection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.7 Final Test Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.7.1 Multi-Bit Upset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.7.2 SET Errors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.7.3 Timing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.8 Remarks on This Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6 Discussion of the Results 115
6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.2 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
6.3 Side Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
7 Conclusions and Future Work 121
7.1 Conclusions of the Present Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
7.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Appendices 125
A VHDL Considerations for Turning FT-UNSHADES into an ATE 127
B PCB Designs for the Microprobe End-Line 129
C Log Files from Radiation Experiments 133
D VHDL Entity for FNV 135







1.1 Explorer I technical details. Source: U.S. Army SMDC . . . . . . 24
1.2 Twins RBSP satellites and Van Allen belts. Image courtesy of
NASA/Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory . . 25
1.3 Activation by capture of slow neutron . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
1.4 Technology Computer Aided Design (TCAD) simulation of ion-
ization track in a MOS transistor after ion strike at normal inci-
dence [33]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
1.5 Parasitic resistors and transistors in CMOS structure giving place
to unwanted thyristor eventually triggered by ion strike. . . . . . . 33
1.6 Propagation Induced Pulse Broadening effect after a transient volt-
age excursion in a node of a chain of inverters. Schematic for
mixed-mode simulation [68]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.7 Schematic of a 6-transistor SRAM cell. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.8 3D model of a 6-transistor SRAM cell for TCAD simulation [33] . 35
1.9 Schema with main blocks in an emulator system managed by a
host computer. Source: [21] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
1.10 Fault Injector architecture for each FF in the design. Source: [22] . 42
1.11 Fault Injector architecture DFFinj for every FF to be injected.
Source: [109] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.12 Big picture of an autonomous hardware emulator. Source: [56] . . 43
1.13 Autonomous hardware emulator block diagram. Source: [56] . . . 44
1.14 FT-UNSHADES board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.15 FT-UNSHADES block diagram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2.1 Pulsed current shaping to simulate the currents appearing after ion
or laser irradiation close to the nodes of a MOS transistor. *Note:
Time is in logarithmic scale, so rise time is orders of magnitude
shorter than fall time. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.2 SPICE parametric simulation to find the threshold value of Qtot in
equation 2.1 giving place to bit-flip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
xvii
List of Figures
2.3 Linear Energy Transfer profile for a 12 MeV Mg ion passing
through a simplified layer model of the AMIS C5 technology. . . . 58
2.4 SRAM cell for mixed simulation Spice-TCAD to estimate the
LET threshold for bit-flip. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
2.5 Mixed-mode transient simulation for the strike of 12 MeV Mg ion
on the cell of Figure 2.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.6 Cross section vs. LET curve. Y-axis represents the probability of
having SEE per unit area and incident ion. The X-axis is the ion
LET. Source: The Aerospace Corporation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.7 Cyclotron at the CNA. Protons were accelerated to 18 MeV for a
first dynamic radiation experiment on a Xilinx CPLD [107]. . . . 63
2.8 Flow chart of the proposed approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
3.1 Figure on the top represents the normal data flow from the DUT
output port and the associated hexadecimal signature or golden
signature. Figure on the bottom represents the circuit operating
under radiation, an erroneous data flow (the error pattern is shad-
owed) and the associated anomalous signature. . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2 Modelsim simulation of a bit-flip induced by pulsed laser irradia-
tion of a digital circuit [85]. The method for error detection in this
case was a coincidence detector designed to be a reduced version
of FT-UNSHADES [3] for radiation experiments. . . . . . . . . . 73
3.3 Signature time delay Td compared to the system clock period Tc. . 74
3.4 Graph illustrating some features of hash functions. . . . . . . . . 75
3.5 A stage of the cryptographic hash function RIPEMD160. . . . . . 77
3.6 Schematic view of the FNV module by the Xilinx Synthesis Tool. 79
4.1 Flow chart of the proposed approach. The left branch corresponds
to the fault dictionary generation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.2 Block Diagram showing integration of the Hash Function in the
classic architecture of FTUNSHADES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3 Multi Bit Upset simulation by proton irradiation, triggering a nu-
clear reaction resulting in direct ionization of several sensitive vol-
umes by an oxygen ion [106]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
4.4 (1/2) Failure percentage distribution attending to the number of
possible faults involved for different programs running on the In-
tel 8051 processor. First sector to the right corresponds to failures
diagnosed without uncertainty (1 to 1). The number of possible
faults involved for a given failure is represented increasing clock-
wise up to 1 to >3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
xviii
List of Figures
4.5 (2/2) Failure percentage distribution attending to the number of
possible faults involved for different programs running on the In-
tel 8051 processor. First sector to the right corresponds to failures
diagnosed without uncertainty (1 to 1). The number of possible
faults involved for a given failure is represented increasing clock-
wise up to 1 to >3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
4.6 Failure percentage distribution for different designs attending to
the number of possible faults involved. First sector to the right
corresponds to failures diagnosed without uncertainty (1 to 1).
The number of possible faults involved for a given failure is rep-
resented increasing clockwise up to 1 to >3. . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
5.1 Flow chart of the proposed approach. The right branch corre-
sponds to the radiation experiment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.2 Automated Test Equipment (ATE) / Test Fixture. . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3 Floor plan of the experimental setup at the CNA facilities. . . . . 101
5.4 Vacuum chamber at the nuclear microprobe line of the 3MV Tan-
dem Van der Graaf Accelerator. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.5 Top plate of the vacuum chamber at the nuclear microprobe line
and target integrated circuit. The golden lid covering the silicon
die is removed before irradiation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
5.6 Layout of one of the six replicas of the circuit under test. . . . . . 103
5.7 JONIC. View of the target die featuring six replicas of the circuit
showed in Figure 5.6. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.8 Block diagram of the design under test. See text for a detailed
description. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
5.9 Waveforms of input stimuli. A glitch is showed in the input data
of the SR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.10 Waveforms of input stimuli. A glitch appears in the signal “ENA”
that controls the parallel load of the PS registers. . . . . . . . . . 107
5.11 Ringing in the clock signal in the DUT side. . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.12 Simulated ionizing LET profile for 13 MeV Carbon ions striking
a layered model of JONIC device. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.13 Detail of the ionizing LET profile in Fig. 5.12 to show direct ion-
ization in the active region of the silicon device. . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.14 Floor plan of the 32-bit Shift Register under radiation. Colored
tiles represent possible patterns for MBU fault injection in order
to get MBU fault dictionaries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6.1 Chart representing the FFs affected during irradiation of the 32b
Shift Register . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
xix
List of Figures
6.2 Chart representing the interval of clock cycles in the workload
affected during irradiation of the 32-bit Shift Register. . . . . . . . 118
6.3 3D graph showing the map of faults in the 32-bit SR. The picture
in the base plane is the actual layout of the shift register. . . . . . 119
6.4 Block diagram of the SET detector in JONIC. . . . . . . . . . . . 119
B.1 Top layer of the testbed holding the DUT inside the microprobe’s
vacuum chamber. Not to scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
B.2 Bottom layer of the testbed holding the DUT inside the micro-
probe’s vacuum chamber. Not to scale. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
B.3 Top layer of the pcb adapter for FT-UNSHADES connection to
the microprobe’s hermetically-sealed feedthrough. Not to scale. . . 131
B.4 Bottom layer of the pcb adapter for FT-UNSHADES connection
to the microprobe’s hermetically-sealed feedthrough. Not to scale. 131
xx
List of Tables
1.1 Total Ionizing Dose effects. Relevant primary and secondary radi-
ations in different mission scenarios. Source: Handbook of Miti-
gation techniques against Radiation Effects for ASICs and FPGAs
[32] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
1.2 Displacement Effects. Relevant primary and secondary radiations
in different mission scenarios. Source: Handbook of Mitigation
techniques against Radiation Effects for ASICs and FPGAs [32] . 28
1.3 Single Event Effects. Relevant primary and secondary radiations
in different mission scenarios. Source: Handbook of Mitigation
techniques against Radiation Effects for ASICs and FPGAs [32] . 29
2.1 Layer model of an AMIS C5 device . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.2 Charge deposition in the layer model of an AMIS C5 device. . . . 59
3.1 Implementation comparison of two different hash algorithms us-
ing Xilinx tools and FPGAs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.1 HDL Synthesis summary for the digital designs used for fault dic-






“I think there’s a little bit of sizzling here. Honestly, I can feel it.
The ions are flying back and forth."
– Regis Philbin




1.1 Electronics and Ionizing Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.2 Radiation Effects on Semiconductors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.3 Hardness Assurance Against Radiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.4 Fault Injection Techniques for Digital Circuits . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.5 Hardware Emulators for Fault Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
1.6 Revision of FT-UNSHADES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
1.7 Scope of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
1.1 Electronics and Ionizing Radiation
Ionizing radiation effects on semiconductors showed up for the first time on sev-
eral in-flight anomalies detected in some missions of the early space race. These
anomalies have been reported since the very beginning of the space era [110].
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Introduction
Figure 1.1: Explorer I technical details. Source: U.S. Army SMDC
In 1953, only six years after the invention of the bipolar transistor, Walter
Kohn (awarded with the Nobel Prize on Chemistry in 1998) started researching
the effects of energetic electrons on semiconductors at Bell Laboratories, under
the supervision of William Bradford Shockley [37]. The aforementioned W. Kohn
wrote: “My project was radiation damage of Si and Ge by energetic electrons,
critical for the use of the recently developed semiconductor devices for applica-
tions in outer space”. It is noticeable that the effects of radiation on semiconductor
devices were a field of study three years before Bardeen, Brattain and Shockley
were awarded with the Nobel Prize on Physics for the invention of the bipolar tran-
sistor. This anecdote is an example on how the race for the leadership on Space
technologies boosted the research of radiation effects on semiconductors.
USA’s first artificial satellite Explorer-I (see Figure 1.1) was launched on Jan-
uary 31, 1958. It carried aboard several Geiger detectors as part of an experiment
proposed by J.A. Van Allen to measure cosmic rays in orbit. When the satel-
lite reached an altitude of 900 km approximately, detectors mysteriously stopped
counting particles. It was found out that Geiger counters had run into saturation
detecting much higher flux of particles than expected in the outer space, so Van
Allen thought it suggested regions of dense radiation surrounding the Earth. That
day were discovered what we know today as Van Allen Belts.
Almost two months later, in March 26, satellite Explorer-III was put into a
very eccentric orbit to measure particle flux densities at a wide range of altitudes
confirming the existence of the Van Allen Belts. Figure 1.2 represents the elec-
tromagnetic confinement of charged particles in the Earth’s magnetic field which
gives place to the so called Van Allen Belts. The picture is an artistic represen-
tation of the twins satellites of the Radiation Belt Storm Probes mission to be
launched no earlier than Aug 23, 2012. There exist two belts consisting mainly
of high energetic electrons (outer belt, 13000-60000 km) and a combination of
protons and electrons (inner belt, 100-10000 km). There are other species of light
24
1.1 Electronics and Ionizing Radiation
Figure 1.2: Twins RBSP satellites and Van Allen belts. Image courtesy of
NASA/Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory
ions like alpha particles but in a minor proportion. Earth’s magnetic field confines
charged particles from the outer space preventing them from reaching Earth’s sur-
face and acting as a shield against solar wind and cosmic rays. Recently it has
been discovered [1] a belt of anti-protons generated by nuclear reactions of galac-
tic cosmic rays interacting with atmosphere. At typical altitudes of civil aviation
and below, the main radiation background consist of neutrons produced in nuclear
reactions after cosmic rays or high energy protons penetrate the atmosphere and
collide with molecules in it.
Few years after launching the Explorer-I, on July 10, 1962, NASA launched
the AT&T’s telecommunication satellite Telstar-1, designed and constructed at
Bell Labs. Telstar-1 started the era of the telecommunications via satellite. A day
before the launching of Telstar-1, on July 9, 1962, the U.S. government carried out
a nuclear experiment in high altitude named Starfish Prime. The experiment con-
sisted on the detonation of a thermonuclear bomb equivalent to 1.4 megatons of
TNT at 400 km of altitude above the Pacific Ocean. Among other consequences,
the detonation injected a big amount of electrons in the magnetic shield of the
Earth, increasing considerably the effects of the Van Allen belts on the electronic
devices aboard Telstar-1. After several failures during almost one year of opera-
tion, the satellite finally lost communications and go out of control on February
21, 1962. It was the first satellite to get lost due to the effects of ionizing radiation
on the electronics aboard. Even though problems on Telstar-1 electronics were in-
directly provoked by the action of humans, other anomalies on electronics caused
by natural space radiation coming from solar wind, cosmic rays and Van Allen
belts appeared since the beginning of space exploration. A data base of satellite
failures on flight can be found on the web [97].
Density of particles is higher at the poles of the terrestrial magnetic axis, which
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is 11o apart from the rotation axis of the Earth. Furthermore, both axes intersect
near 500 km above the center of the Earth. This tilt and translation make the south
pole of the inner belt closer to the Earth than the north pole originating a region
known as the South Atlantic Anomaly (SAA) centered close to the coast of Brazil.
The SAA is the area where the trapped particles are closest to Earth’s surface, af-
fecting considerably satellites operating at Low Earth Orbit (LEO) which usually
switch off their electronics devices when passing through it.
But the problem of radiation on electronics is also present at sea level. First
failures reported occurred in 1978 when Intel engineers detected several errors
in the stored data of Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) modules. Those
effects were named soft fails. The origin of the radiation in this case were traces of
radioactive elements in the chip encapsulation producing a yield of high energetic
alpha particles.
Traditionally the major concerns on the effects of radiation on components
and systems were for the space agencies, aerospace industries and for military
industry involved in aerospace technologies. However, the increasing scale of in-
tegration of new technology nodes is bringing all the issues of radiation closer to
other electronic industries like computer makers and automotive industry mainly,
among others.
1.2 Radiation Effects on Semiconductors
As far as this thesis is not directly related to the physics of semiconductors, the
present chapter is intended to provide a brief introduction to different effects ob-
served in semiconductor devices when irradiated with high energetic particles or
photons, without setting out the solid state physics and equations behind them.
Interaction of radiation with semiconductors can be classified in three main types
attending to the physical effect involved. These types are:
• Activation by Nuclear Reactions
• Displacement Damage Effects
• Ionizing Effects
All these effects must be taken into consideration when designing for reliability in
harsh radiation environments and it is not trivial to test hardening against one of
this physical effects without being affected by another. For instance, experiments
with protons to test soft error rates in a bank of memories must control carefully
the fluence of the irradiation session, to prevent dose effects from appearing [78].
It is of great importance to know about side effects during radiation experiments
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Mission Important primary Important secondary
type radiations radiation
LEO
·Trapped p and e−
X-rays from e−·Solar p
High MEO
·Trapped e−
X-rays from e−·Solar protons
Low MEO
·Trapped e−
X-rays from e−·Solar p
GEO
·Low Energy trapped p















Table 1.1: Total Ionizing Dose effects. Relevant primary and secondary radia-
tions in different mission scenarios. Source: Handbook of Mitigation
techniques against Radiation Effects for ASICs and FPGAs [32]
to account for unwanted phenomena like degradation in the performance of the
device or errors coming from causes other than the targeted in the experiment.
Discrimination of the errors observed at the outputs of irradiated circuits is a major
issue and is one of the motivations of this thesis, as discussed in section 1.7.
The consequences of radiation on devices depend on several factors, as the
absorbed dose or the energy of the incoming radiation. High radiation doses can
lead to the complete destruction of the device or a permanent failure state only
recoverable through annealing or hard resetting. Destructive or physical damage
is out of the scope of this thesis and neither non-destructive effects like aging
nor performance degradation due to total ionizing dose are considered after this
preliminary chapter. Only Soft Errors due to single events will be considered and
are suitable for the test technique developed in this thesis. The main radiation
effects threatening the reliability of electronics during space missions are showed
in Tables 1.1, 1.2 y 1.3.
Among ionizing effects, it is necessary to differentiate between accumulated
dose effects and single-event effects in semiconductor technologies. Each type of
them will be described separately later in this section.
Single-event Effects on Metal-Oxide-Semiconductor devices are of special in-
terest and typical errors affecting Complementary-MOS transistors will be dis-
cussed in more detail due to the presence of this technology in today electronics.
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Table 1.2: Displacement Effects. Relevant primary and secondary radiations in
different mission scenarios. Source: Handbook of Mitigation tech-
niques against Radiation Effects for ASICs and FPGAs [32]
1.2.1 Activation by Nuclear Reactions
Stable nuclei exposed to a flux of energetic particles are candidate to go unstable
and radioactive due to nuclear reactions. Particle like protons, neutrons or ions can
strike a stable nucleus and remove some nucleons by inelastic scattering. Also low
energy neutrons can be captured by a nucleus making it unstable. These nuclei
decay by emission of radiation usually in the form of positrons, that can ionize the
surroundings in what is a sort of indirect ionization (see Figure 1.3).
There are a variety of possible nuclear reactions with a corresponding cross
section1 depending on the incident particle and the targeted nucleus but the most
common in space environments are those produced by high energy protons. Ion-
ization from secondary particles like neutrons are specially important in thick ma-
terials.
The most important source of activation is an intensive proton flux located
at altitudes of inner Van Allen Belt’s equator, with energies ranging from 30 to
400 MeV. For other altitudes, cosmic rays are the leading source of activation and
for interplanetary distances solar protons dominate [44]. Except for the case of
1The concept of cross section is widely used in nuclear physics to measure the probability of a
given nuclear interaction and is measured in barns (10−28m2). The cross section is the equivalent
area of the whole target nucleus area producing a given reaction.
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Table 1.3: Single Event Effects. Relevant primary and secondary radiations in
different mission scenarios. Source: Handbook of Mitigation tech-
niques against Radiation Effects for ASICs and FPGAs [32]
Figure 1.3: Activation by capture of slow neutron
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neutrons with no direct ionization, dose due to activation by nuclear reaction is
smaller than dose due to primary particle ionization.
1.2.2 Displacement Damage Effects
When particles pass through semiconductors, elastic collisions with atoms in the
crystal lattice can result in displacement effects. Eventually the hit of an ion re-
sults in the displacement of one lattice atom leaving a vacancy. These defects in
the crystal lattice affect the periodicity of the crystal structure, allowing new en-
ergy states or energy traps in the band gap for the electrons in the semiconductor,
affecting charge carriers mobility. This kind of structural damage is quantified by
the Non-Ionizing Energy Loss (NIEL) related to the material for a given incident
ion. Macroscopically, the effect associated to displacement damage is a degrada-
tion in the electrical response of the device like increase in leakage currents or
gain deterioration in bipolar devices. A complete survey on displacement damage
effects on silicon can be found in [102].
1.2.3 Total Ionizing Dose
When ionizing radiation pass through the bulk of a semiconductor device, a num-
ber of electron-hole pairs are created. The so generated charged particles quickly
recombine as they move away by drift-diffusion mechanisms. Charge built up in
dielectric layers and interfaces however is not removed easily, mainly the positive
charge that remain trapped for long time. Long term exposition to radiation led
to the well-known ionizing dose effects. In CMOS devices, charge generated by
ionizing radiation in the gate oxide is the responsible for aging or degradation of
the electrical characteristics of the device. A common effect in CMOS transistors
is a progressive shift in the threshold voltage that increase with dose and directly
impact noise margins in digital circuits.
It is important to note that from 130 nm CMOS processes and on, the gate
oxide is thin enough to prevent trapped charge from appearing due to quantum
tunnel effect. Hence, total dose in modern devices is not so critical and fluence
must not be a serious problem in Single Event Effect (SEE) radiation experiments
[10].
There are other effects related to rapid increase in the dose rate resulting in
the injection of big amounts of electron-hole pairs in the semiconductor. The sub-
sequent effects are mainly transient excursion in voltage signals.
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1.2.4 Single-Event Effects
These effects are particular cases of ionization where the strike of a single ion or
neutron on the active areas of a semiconductor can lead to what is also known as
Single-event phenomena (SEP). Depending on the sensitivity of the device, the
resulting effect can destruct it or corrupt in some sense its functionality. Figure
1.4 illustrates the ionization track along the first microns of the bulk region in a
MOS transistor.
The charge deposition by an ionizing particle passing through a MOS device
provokes fast current fluxes in neighbor contact nodes, which lead to transient
voltages in capacitive loads. The current pulse is usually modeled like a double
exponential with parameters obtained heuristically from experiments, as seen later
in this chapter.
The integration of this current pulse is the charge collected and is directly
related to the charge deposited by the incident particle. The amount of charge
collected is the key parameter determining the behavior of the circuit, but also
the shape of this current is influencing as can be read in [41]. When considering
Single Event Upsets (SEU) in SRAM cells, there is a threshold value for the mini-
mum charge deposited by the ionizing particle giving place to the flip of the stored
bit, this values is known as critical charge (Qcrit) [28]. High-scaled technologies
feature low critical charge, this way lowering more and more the ion linear energy
transfer (LET) threshold required to achieve a bit-flip. On the other side, the sensi-
tive volume is also lower in modern technologies balancing the effect of decreased
(Qcrit) and giving place to a repertory of single event effects [12].
The Dictionary of Terms for Solid State Technology [48] includes the follow-
ing definitions adopted in this thesis and introduced here for the sake of language
accuracy in the rest of the document:
• SEB - Single-event Burnout. An event in which a single energetic-particle
strike induces a localized high-current state in a device that results in catas-
trophic failure. This effect is associated normally to power MOSFET de-
vices.
• SEFI - Single-event Functional Interruption. A soft error that causes the
component to reset, lock-up, or otherwise malfunction in a detectable way,
but does not require power cycling of the device (off and back on) to re-
store operability, unlike single-event latch-up (SEL), or result in permanent
damage as in single event burnout (SEB).
• SEGR - Single-event Gate Rupture. An event in which a single energetic-
particle strike results in a breakdown and subsequent conducting path through
the gate oxide of a MOSFET.
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Figure 1.4: Technology Computer Aided Design (TCAD) simulation of ioniza-
tion track in a MOS transistor after ion strike at normal incidence
[33].
• SEH:SHE - Single-event Hard Error. An irreversible change in operation
resulting from a single radiation event and typically associated with perma-
nent damage to one or more elements of a device (e.g., gate oxide rupture).
• SEL - Single-event Latch-up. An abnormal high-current state in a device
caused by the passage of a single energetic particle through sensitive re-
gions of the device structure and resulting in the loss of device functionality.
• SET - Single-event transient. A momentary voltage excursion (voltage spike)
at a node in an integrated circuit caused by a single energetic-particle
strike.
• SEU - Single-event upset. A soft error caused by the signal induced by a
single energetic-particle strike.2
• MCU - Multiple-cell upset. A single event that induces several bits in an IC
to fail at the same time.
• MBU - Multiple-bit Upset. A multiple-cell upset (MCU) in which two or
more error bits occur in the same word.
In the context of this thesis, the only events of concern are those provoking
soft errors or non-destructive effects.
2In some publications the term SEU also covers latch-up events
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Figure 1.5: Parasitic resistors and transistors in CMOS structure giving place to
unwanted thyristor eventually triggered by ion strike.
• Single-event Latch-up.
Single-event latch-up usually leads to destruction of the affected device if it
is not unbiased immediately by an anti-latch-up circuit or similar. In CMOS
technology, the charge generated along the ion track can trigger a parasitic
thyristor between the power rails (see Figure 1.5) that only can be switched
off by opening the supply current path. In some circumstances, it is possible
that, due to serial resistance from other parts of the circuit, the consumption
is limited and the device is not burned out. These cases are commonly de-
tected as stuck-at bits tied to a fixed voltage.
It is worth noting that single-event latch-up can’t show “latchup windows”
[49] as in the case of dose rate irradiation [9] from gamma ray for example.
• Single-event Transient.
The immediate effect after an ion strikes a semiconductor device is a fast
current appearing in the affected node. In CMOS devices this current either
charges or discharges the capacity associated with the node giving place to a
rapid momentary change in the voltage [24]. These voltage glitches behave
as pulses propagating through combinational logic to reach sequential ele-
ments like flip-flops. Along the path, these pulses eventually get broader by
a phenomenon known as Propagation Induced Pulse Broadening or PIPB
Effect [68]. This effect makes transient pulses more likely to be captured
by a clock edge when reaching flip-flops, corrupting one or more elements.









Figure 1.6: Propagation Induced Pulse Broadening effect after a transient volt-
age excursion in a node of a chain of inverters. Schematic for mixed-
mode simulation [68].
Figure 1.7: Schematic of a 6-transistor SRAM cell.
• Single-event Upset
The existence of SEU errors was discovered in 1975 [16] although were
predicted back in 1969 [112]. The most well known device upset is proba-
bly the event of a ion striking a SRAM cell. The upset consists of flipping
the logical state stored in the cell. The flipping of a bit is not necessarily
an error, since the Flip-Flop (FF) can be rewritten before the corrupt data
propagates to other parts of the circuits. Figure 1.7 is the schematic of a typ-
ical SRAM cell with two inverters connected back-to-back in a metastable
configuration. The transient charge unbalance created by an ion strike can
change the state of Q. A Technology Computer Aided Design (TCAD) 3D
model of the SRAM cell is showed in Figure 1.8
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Figure 1.8: 3D model of a 6-transistor SRAM cell for TCAD simulation [33]
As discussed later in Section 1.7, the present thesis focuses on test methods
for soft errors. Hence for the rest of the document all the references to er-
rors, test methods, techniques or whatever other topics, must be understood
regarding soft errors in semiconductor devices. Dose effects on semicon-
ductors are out of the scope of this Thesis.
1.3 Hardness Assurance Against Radiation
Hardness assurance of electronic parts is a major issue in aerospace industry where
semiconductor devices are supposed to be exposed to harsh radiation environ-
ments. The Space Product Assurance standard ECSS-Q-ST-60-02C for ASIC and
FPGA development establishes a comprehensive set of guidelines for designers
including requirements for hardness assurance against radiation. Also the ESA
Handbook on Space engineering product assurance entitled: “Techniques for Ra-
diation Effects Mitigation in ASICs and FPGAs” deal with validation methods for
the mitigation of radiation effects. Nowadays in space missions, radiation engi-
neers have to get involved from the early stages of the project. As CMOS technol-
ogy nodes go deeper and deeper into the nanometer scale, other industries with
high reliability constraints at ground level are also concerned about environment
radiation and usually maintain task forces in the field of radiation hardness vali-
dation. The techniques and procedures developed in this thesis are intended to be
a contribution in this field.
In computer industry for example, equipments deploying big amount of mem-
ory banks such as racks of servers are statistically more vulnerable and tradition-
ally implemented mitigation techniques against radiation. The higher and higher
integration and density of memory cells make these devices the most vulnerable,
and the most significant contribution to the Soft Error Rate (SER) in System on
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Chip (SoC) devices. This point explains why memories have been the “laboratory
rats” for researchers, with tons of papers on TCAD and Spice simulations, radi-
ation tests for different species of ions and neutrons, design best practices, etc.
Serve as an example the widely tested 6-transistor SRAM (Static Random Access
Memory) cells.
As mentioned in Section 1.1, soft errors in commercial electronic devices were
reported more than 30 years ago, however the history of standards for commercial
semiconductor industry is much more recent. JEDEC standard JESD89A “Mea-
surement and Reporting of Alpha Particle and Terrestrial Cosmic Ray-Induced
Soft Errors in Semiconductor Devices” is the main document regarding testing of
Soft Error Rates of integrated circuits and reporting of results. The Automotive
Electronics Council (AEC) published requirements for common electrical com-
ponent qualification. Document AEC-Q100-Rev-G “Failure Mechanism Based
Stress Test Qualification for Integrated Circuits” specifies the cases when inte-
grated circuits require SER testing and refers to the JESD89 standard for the
test method. Also DO-254 and IEC/TS 62396 are examples for standards of the
avionic industry considering radiation effects issues.
Space and military agencies started standardization and certification proce-
dures for electronic parts hardness assurance establishing the guidelines for radia-
tion testing as in the ESA/SCC Basic Specification No.25100 from the European
Space Agency (ESA) or the MIL-STD-750 from the Department of Defense of
the United States of America.
There are several papers on design for soft error mitigation, for example [79],
with several approaches to enhance robustness against soft error due to radiation.
Testing integrated circuits against environmental radiation is an issue of con-
cern in modern electronic technologies and researchers all over the world are more
and more interested in. As long as new hardness strategies and procedures de-
velop, big effort need to be made on the methods to test these advances
1.4 Fault Injection Techniques for Digital Circuits
Fault injection plays a key role in this thesis as introduced in section 1.3. In the
SER test methodology presented in this thesis, a preliminary massive fault injec-
tion campaign is required to generate a full-coverage fault dictionary for the Cir-
cuit Under Test (CUT). The more complete the fault dictionary, the more likely to
diagnose faults in the radiation experiment. Of course, covering the whole avail-
able cause of errors in a medium-size digital circuit can be a very time consuming
task, in much cases unaffordable. Hence, the fault injection platform must be cho-
sen to optimize the generation of the fault dictionary.
There is a wide spectrum of techniques aimed to inject faults in digital circuits
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and of course there is no universal platform suitable for all purposes, generally
different needs require different fault injection platforms. The main use of these
platforms is in validating mitigation techniques at the design stage as in [53].
A well-established classification from text [13] for fault injection techniques is
adopted in this document to introduce the state of the art in this field.
Fault injection (FI) platforms must optimize preferably Controllability, Ob-
servability, Intrusiveness, Velocity and Cost. Controllability in this context is the
ability to induce faults in all the elements in the target susceptible to fail. Observ-
ability is the capacity to observe in time and space the internal and external state
of the target. Intrusiveness is the degree of target instrumentation by the injector,
it is desirable to have as less intrusiveness as possible. Velocity and Cost must
be also taken into consideration. Most of FI techniques are in a tradeoff between
these properties and have a limited field of application. The use of these tools is
traditionally in the design stages of integrated circuits and in tests of reliability or
fault tolerance to faults induced by radiation.
Induced faults in fault injectors are models of the physical fault suitable for a
determined level of abstraction, except in the case of ion beam induced faults. In
the Register Transfer Level (RTL), the “bit-flip” model of error is of great interest
when dealing with soft errors in digital circuits. Except by SET in analog cir-
cuits, all soft-SEE can be modeled using the bit-flip model. So this is an atomistic
building block to model more complex effects like MCU or MBU.
The bit-flip model is essential in the development of this thesis and is the
model adopted for most of fault injectors used to model soft errors. The concept
is quite simple and consist of flipping the logic state of a single bit in a given
clock cycle. Other models are the stuck-at fault and the bridging. Stuck-at model
consists of forcing either logic high or low value in a given port, bit or flip-flop in
the Device Under Test (DUT). Bridging is induced by forcing a single port, bit or
flip-flop to the logical value of an adjacent port, bit or flip-flop.
1.4.1 Hardware-Based Fault Injection: HWFI
Hardware Fault Injection requires a hardware architecture (in most cases ad-hoc
hardware) suitable for fault injection and storage of the resulting effects. For these
techniques a working prototype of the DUT must be available, so that these tech-
niques are not to be used in the early stages of the design. There are several plat-
forms for fault injection based on the stuck-at or bridging fault models. The usual
way to inject these faults is by sticking or bridging some pins in the prototype,
so that these methods are referred to as “pin-level” fault injection. Examples of
this approach are MESSALINE [8] developed by the LAAS Research Center at




Another approach is to inject faults by mean of ion beams generated in a par-
ticle accelerator (low controlability) which is in fact the most appropriate test to
reproduce the operating conditions in a harsh radiation environments (except by
in-flight radiation experiments, of course). For these purposes, the TIMA Labo-
ratory developed THESIC [111] and THESIC+ [34] for radiation testing of Inte-
grated Circuits. To some extent, all radiation test facilities offer a basic testbed
for the user to setup an experiment. Intense pulsed laser is a widely used alter-
native to particle accelerators to inject faults in integrated circuits using backside
irradiation with good results [62].
The main advantage of HWFI techniques is in the execution time of injection
campaigns (not so the setup time) since the DUT is clocked at hardware speed.
There is also the possibility of inducing faults in some blocks that are not accessi-
ble by other methods. Some withdraws are usually rigidity, limited observability
and poor controlability.
1.4.2 Software-Based Fault Injection: SWFI
These techniques don’t need a final prototype of the DUT and are mainly aimed to
test complex systems like microprocessors or microcontrollers. The observability
and controllability is normally limited to user or context registers and the targets
in this case are code blocks, subroutines or applications running in a given micro-
processor of interest. The code under execution is modified to change the normal
operation of the system in the same way that it would happen when affected by ra-
diation. It is possible in some cases to inject faults in several levels of abstraction,
from RTL or failures at the memory elements, to errors in applications like packet
duplication in communication networks. A common approach [51] is to include
a Code Emulated Upset (CEU) that deliberately corrupts data in a given memory
address and is triggered by an interruption request. One of the disadvantages of
these techniques are a speed penalty due software execution. There are several
mature platforms available like FERRARI [52] or XCEPTION [59].
1.4.3 Simulation-Based Fault Injection: SBFI
A model of the Device Under Test is simulated in a computer and faults are in-
jected by changing logic levels in the model during simulation. These techniques
allow for fault tolerance studies in the design stage of the DUT, when still no
prototypes are available. Of course, an HDL model of the DUT must be avail-
able, which is not always possible. The main advantage is a great observability
and controllability, and the major drawback is the penalty in velocity due to all
the system is software-based. These approaches provide high observability and
controllability.
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The most commonly used technique consists of simulating HDL models of the
DUT. Among the SBFI platforms we can mention MEFISTO [17], AMATISTA
[35] or the “SEU Simulation Tool” [36] developed by the European Space Agency
(ESA) and nowadays exploited by the Antonio de Nebrija University for fault
tolerance analysis [94].
1.4.4 Hybrid Techniques: Hardware Emulation
Hardware emulation is a type of hybrid technique combining the advantages of
SBFI and HWFI techniques. The properties of FPGA devices make them very
attractive to be used for hardware emulation. The use of FPGAs allows to synthe-
size an (VHDL) model of the DUT to test it at hardware speeds, moreover fault
injection can be performed via reconfiguration or instrumentation of the DUT (as
usually in HWFI techniques). FPGA-based tools are versatile and fault injection
campaigns can be highly controllable with full access to all the registers in the
design. Cost is not an issue due to constant decrease of prices and enhancement of
FPGA technologies. Execution times are improved several order of magnitude in
comparison to SWFI techniques. Observability is usually a tradeoff to time, but if
time is not a major constraint, full observability is usually achieved. Primary clas-
sification in hardware emulation techniques is based on the injection mechanism,
differentiating between fault injection by reconfiguration and instrumented fault
injection.
Due to the full controllability and high fault rates achieved, hardware emu-
lation is the proper approach for the purpose of this thesis where massive fault
injection campaigns are demanded for generating fault dictionaries. Next section
is dedicated to a more in-depth analysis of hardware emulation techniques.
1.5 Hardware Emulators for Fault Injection
This section is a revision of several techniques for hardware emulation based on
SRAM FPGAs. Firstly, two different approaches are introduced with the different
variants that are commonly encountered in the specialized literature. Afterward
a first classification is done of the different fault injection platforms operating in
the context of a FARM [8] campaign. The FARM model implies the selection of
the set of faults to be injected (F: Faults), establishing the set of test vectors to
stimulate the system to be evaluated (A: Activation), compilation of observations
(R: Readouts) and measuring the reliability of the system (M: Measurements).
The field of application of hardware emulators is in the RTL level of abstrac-
tion which turns to be a powerful scenario as discussed in the following.
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Actual FPGAs allow for the emulation of systems made of thousands or even
millions of equivalent logic gates and can be used to setup fault injections exper-
iments in systems from the proper HDL description. Fault injection techniques in
FPGAs also allow for a more accurate and flexible analysis than that from HWFI
techniques, since it is possible to inject faults in a controlled manner in all the reg-
isters of the design with similar execution times. There are of course a remarkable
advantage in execution times when comparing with SBFI techniques [54]. All the
platforms described in this section use the bit-flip model but most of them can be
tuned to also inject stuck-at faults and others. Stuck-at faults particularly are of
great interest for dependability testing community and early works on hardware
emulation were based on that fault model [20, 45].
Fault effects are generally classified with the following criteria:
• Failure. Fault induces a wrong behavior observed at the output ports during
the execution of the test.
• Latent Fault. Fault modifies the internal logical state of the system with no
effects at the outputs during the execution of the test.
• Silent Fault. Fault is removed by the design itself. The affected register is
overwritten before fault propagates.
The duration of a fault injection campaign can be estimated by taking into
account the number of flip-flops (FF) in the circuit and the number of clock cycles
in the whole test-bench (C). If one wants to inject systematically in each and
every single FF in the DUT, then the product FFxC is a low limit for the time
in clock cycles required to complete such a campaign. Moreover, for systematic
campaigns with faults induced in every FF but also in every clock cycle, the low
limit is given by FFxCxC clock cycles3. As an example, for a set of test vectors
with 106 clock cycles and a DUT with 10000 FFs, clocked to 10 Mhz, the resulting
systematic campaign would take 31.7 years. So that test-benches and DUT size
must be constrained to the capacity of the platform to be used. Anyway, speed
optimization is achieved only by mean of hardware emulation. Chapter 4 deals
in detail with fault injection works done for this thesis. There exist basically two
different approaches to inject faults in systems emulated in FPGAs attending to
the injection mechanism: Instrumented Fault Injection and Fault Injection by
Reconfiguration.
3There are platforms able to lower this limit by saving the whole state of the system before
injection, resuming the emulation from this saved state for subsequent injections.
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Figure 1.9: Schema with main blocks in an emulator system managed by a host
computer. Source: [21]
1.5.1 Instrumented Fault Injection
Instrumentation consists of adding specific injection blocks to the original HDL
model of the DUT to have external access to the elements to be attacked by mean
of extra ports. There are several tools based on this concept that have proven to be
successful. Instrumentation, as it implies modification on the design to be tested,
is intrusive, which is probably the major disadvantage of this approach. Moreover
there is an area overhead that can’t be neglected if injection is required to cover all
the flip-flops of the design. On the other hand, execution times in these approaches
is minimized and very high fault rates are achieved. The fault injection blocks are
attached to FFs in the design and connected in a daisy chain or scan-path. The
stimuli test vectors are stored in a buffer controlled by the host. Emulator applies
test vectors to the instant previous to injection and then resume the execution to
the end of test vectors. Failure is detected by comparison of DUT outputs with
error-free outputs. Whenever the error is detected and classified before the end of
the test vectors, the host stops the run. Fault injection rates reported are really high
as in [21] where a score of 100 µs/fault is achieved.
1.5.1.1 Emulation Systems Depending on a Host
Researchers at the Instituto Politecnico di Torino developed a platform for instru-
mented fault injection [22] with a host computer managing the fault list, operation
and result evaluation during the campaign. This architecture is depicted in Figure
1.9. Fault Injection Manager or FIM is the core of the system and is in charge
of picking up faults from a fault list (optimized by the Fault List Manager which
is able to perform fault collapsing [14] to some extent, to avoid faults leading
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Figure 1.10: Fault Injector architecture for each FF in the design. Source: [22]
to identical results), fault injection in the emulated circuit and evaluation of the
emulation results.
The host downloads to the FPGA the instrumented version of the hardware
description of the DUT where every FF is modified in the way showed in Figure
1.10. As can be observed, an extra FF and a multiplexer are introduced making
up the basic unity of a parallel-to-serial shift register which is the building block
of the scan-path. Between this block and the original FF there are glue logic to
externally trigger the injection which flips the logic value coming in from the
circuit.
Before injection, a fault-free run allows to store the golden outputs that will be
used to detect failures during the fault campaign by cycle-by-cycle comparison.
The scan-path is serially loaded with the fault mask used to set the FF to be flipped
(all-zero chain with 1 in the selected FF) and the test vectors are applied to the
clock cycle previous to the injection. Then the “inject” input is asserted and the
execution resumes. It is noticeable that the logic state of each FF can be saved for
subsequent runs and also to detect latent damage.
Another approach is described in [109]. Here, every FF is replaced by a struc-
ture named DFFinj that is showed in Figure 1.11. The clock of the DUT is held
and then a CLKSEU cycle is applied to flip the logic value stored in the FF if INJ
is asserted. In this case, there is no way to save the state of the FFs.
All the inputs for the injection instrument are shared across the DUT except
by the INJ signal. That input is dedicated, so it is necessary to implement as much
ones of them as FFs are instrumented, which can be a limitation.
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Figure 1.11: Fault Injector architecture DFFinj for every FF to be injected.
Source: [109]
Figure 1.12: Big picture of an autonomous hardware emulator. Source: [56]
1.5.1.2 Autonomous Emulation System
The autonomous emulator is not interacting with a host during the fault injection
campaign. This way, the rate of fault injections is maximized with no latencies due
to data traffic between host and emulator. Data from each run is stored in RAM
memories on board that are dumped to the host computer when filled (see Figure
1.12). The only communication between host and emulator is established at the
beginning and at the end of the campaign.
Figure 1.12 shows the block diagram of the architecture. As can be seen, all
the blocks are implemented in the FPGA except by the RAM module. The core of
the system is the Emulation Controller (EC) which manages the whole execution.
RAM memories on board provide a test vector each clock cycle and also store the
expected output vector (error-free run).
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Figure 1.13: Autonomous hardware emulator block diagram. Source: [56]
The EC block commands the application of stimuli to the circuit under eval-
uation, the injection of the faults and the storage of fault evaluation in the RAM
memory. There are modules detecting failures at the circuit’s outputs by direct
comparison with the expected outputs.
The most complete implementation of this technique is achieved by replacing
every single FF in the circuit under test by the block depicted in Figure 1.13. This
way, the golden and faulty instances of the design are multiplexed in time, sharing
the same combinational logic. There are FFs capturing the state of both instances
and an Error signal that is asserted if a discrepancy is found. There exists also the
possibility of saving the state of the design at any clock cycle in the run, so runs
can be started from the cycle prior to the fault injection.
Autonomous hardware emulation is by far the fastest way for fault injection,
of course there is a penalty in area overhead and presumably in the process of
instrumentation of the design, if it is relatively complex.
1.5.2 Fault Injection by Reconfiguration
Reconfiguration is the technique consisting of a partial or total change in the con-
figuration bits of an SRAM or Flash FPGA that can be achieved in the field. Re-
configuration is always4 a time consuming process that contributes to delay the
whole campaign execution time, so that it is very important to optimize the in-
jection process timing. This is probably the main penalty for this techniques, spe-
cially for those requiring full reconfiguration. On the other hand, these techniques
4It is possible to achieve reconfiguration without halting the device but it depends on designs
made from parts running independently
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are not intrusive since no additional HDL blocks need to be added to the design
for the purpose of fault injection.
From long ago, FPGAs allow for partial reconfiguration of the configuration
bits reducing drastically the time needed to modify the implemented design or
application. For this reason, most of modern techniques used for fault injection
rely on partial reconfiguration. Nevertheless, early works like [20] were also based
on full reconfiguration, in that case to inject stuck-at faults.
The whole process is commanded by a host application running in a computer
and the set of test vectors is stored in memories on board using compression algo-
rithms. There are two ways to cope with reconfiguration regarding the execution
of the application implemented in the FPGA. Reconfiguration performed before
starting execution is known as Compile-Time Reconfiguration or CTR [46] and
reconfiguration in run-time is known as RTR [7]. In the context of fault injection,
CTR implies that fault is present in the DUT from the very beginning of the test as
in [5]. Run-time reconfiguration is performed by halting the running application in
the FPGA for globally or partially reconfiguring it and then resuming execution.
In [7] RTR is performed to inject stuck-at and bit-flip faults in the DUT. How-
ever, the proposed methodology is not optimizing the reconfiguration time, be-
cause a complete reading of all the FFs in the FPGA is necessary, which makes
delays depending on the size of the configuration file. In this case, the Jbits API
[38] is used to interface the DUT implementation running in the FPGA. Another
approach is reported in [26] where only the portion of the configuration memory
where the FF to be injected is allocated, needs to be read and modified. The Xilinx
Radiation Test Consortium (XRTC) developed a Fault Injector that is also a test
platform for radiation experiments intended to test SRAM FPGAs .
Hardware emulation is the proper technique for massive campaigns as required
for the purposes of this thesis. Among the existing techniques for HWFI, in the
context of this thesis, a high automation would be desirable to enhance campaign
timing, since user only need to define an initial massive campaign and then press
the “big button” to record all the possible responses of the CUT. Attending to time
consumption, which is probably the major constraint in the technique proposed
in this thesis, autonomous emulation is the most suitable approach. However, as
far as it is not in the scope of this thesis to achieve the best performance, the
well-known FT-UNSHADES platform has been deployed with excellent results.
Moreover, the more sophisticated FTU25 fault injection platform is inheriting the
know-how from FT-UNSHADES and will be ready to perform autonomous emu-
lation for systematic campaigns.
Next section is entirely devoted to a detailed description of FT-UNSHADES,
the fault injection platform used in this thesis to generate fault dictionaries per-
5System under development. More information on FTU2 can be obtained from [69]
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Figure 1.14: FT-UNSHADES board.
forming partial RTR via Select-MAP.
1.6 Revision of FT-UNSHADES
FT-UNSHADES is a hardware emulator for fault injection analysis of digital de-
signs based on Xilinx FPGAs (see the platform board in Figure 1.14). The system
is intended to perform early evaluation of design reliability against soft errors. The
design under test is implemented in a system-FPGA from its hardware descrip-
tion or a netlist file, and faults are injected dynamically by partial reconfiguration
via Select-MAP. Therefore, the emulator works at the Register Transfer Level. A
complete description of the system can be found in [76].
The basic operation mode of the emulator consists of the injection of a fault by
flipping a single or multiple FF in the whole design. By mean of capture-readback-
reconfiguration cycles, it is possible to get the state of a single FF, change it and
then reload the new value in run time.
A host application running on a computer processes a file containing the logic
allocation (.ll) of the netlist in the FPGA device featured by the emulator. The allo-
cation file is generated by Xilinx standard tools and contains information relating
the logical resources in the FPGA with the netlist synthesized in the early steps of
the design process. All the configuration bits in the FPGA dedicated to implement
user’s funcionality are perfectly related to a node in the design netlist. This way
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Figure 1.15: FT-UNSHADES block diagram.
is how FT-UNSHADES assures observability. The test is also perfectly control-
lable since DUT clock can be paused in a precise test cycle and faults injected in
whichever FF in the design, providing also full controllability.
This tool is mainly conceived for fine selection of targeted registers before
starting the fault injection campaigns and not so to perform massive attack over
the whole design, as done by some other tools introduced in section 1.5. There are
more information available at the web sites: [4, 72]
1.6.1 Basic Operation
The main component in the system is a Xilinx Virtex-II FPGA where the Module
Under Test (MUT) is instanced two times, one of them is used for fault injec-
tion and is known as SEU-MUT, and the other is used as an error-free instance
running in parallel, known as GOLD-MUT. The golden replica is there for output
comparison. The architecture of this basic operation mode is shown in figure 1.15.
Together with the two instances of the MUT there are an extra module to manage
test timing and for the application of the input stimuli. The test shell controls the
MUT clock to pause the execution, inject the fault and resume execution. If logic
for comparison detects any discrepancy between SEU and GOLD instances, the
test is stopped and the error logged.
The basic mode of operation is not suitable to be used for microprocessor
systems where the running program can implement self-recovery subroutines if
errors are detected. In such cases, the two MUT instances in the basic mode of
operation go out of synchronism (misaligning) for the number of clock cycles that
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takes to the SEU-MUT instance to repair the damage. To avoid this situation, the
Smart Table mode of operation was developed for FT-UNSHADES, that replaces
the GOLD-MUT by a table containing the expected outputs for the processor for
all the workload. The Smart Table also controls the possible misaligning in the
outputs with a time-to-recovery parameter that flag a non-corrected error when it
is exceeded [39]. This mode of operation is known as FT-UNSHADES-uP.
An extra operation mode was also implemented to inject faults in the configu-
ration bits of the FPGA instead of injecting in the FF of the design. This mode of
operation is known as FT-UNSHADES-C [40].
For this thesis, a new operation mode has been developed to use FT-UNSHADES
in a real radiation test with little modification of the basic mode operation. This
mode is explained in detail later in Chapter 4.
1.6.2 Injection Run
A whole fault injection campaign is made of a number of “Injection Runs” where a
time and location are defined to perform injection in the design. These runs imply
a complete execution of the workload with at least one bit-flip insertion. The steps
followed in a single run are summarized here:
1. The clock cycle for fault injection and the targeted FF or FFs are sent to the
control FPGA in the FT-UNSHADES board.
2. The test shell stores the injection cycle and starts the run.
3. When the workload cycle equals the injection cycle, the execution is paused
and the targeted FF or FFs are flipped. This step implies a capture-readback-
reconfiguration cycle involving the host computer6.
4. The execution is resumed until an error is detected at the outputs or until the
workload is completed.
5. If an error is detected, the cycle of detection and port affected are stored.
There are complete flexibility to inject faults whatever in the design and in the
time of execution. It is also possible to inject more than one bit-flip in a single
clock cycle to emulate MBU or MCU.
In some cases of interest, it is possible to perform cycle-by-cycle analysis to
check fault propagation through the circuit.
6This transaction with the host computer will be avoided in the upcoming FTU2 system,
speeding-up considerably the time per injection.
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1.7 Scope of the Thesis
To set out the reasons and circumstances that motivated the work done for this
thesis, it is necessary to introduce the recent activity of the research group that
the author belongs. This thesis has been developed in the context of three techni-
cal projects: EMULASER, RENASER and RENASER+ in which the author got
involved the last four years.
Project EMULASER (Emulation of the effects of cosmic particles on elec-
tronics by LASER irradiation) was co-funded by the Spanish Center for Indus-
trial Technological Development (CDTI) and the Spanish Ministry of Industry,
Tourism and Commerce to be a study of viability on the industrial use of pulsed
laser for fault injection in semiconductor devices for aerospace systems. EMU-
LASER put together several task forces with different capabilities in the field of
the effects of radiation on electronics to approach the problem from different an-
gles, from solid state physics TCAD simulation to pulsed laser experiments. The
use of hardware emulators was proved to be useful to improve the visibility of test
vectors in the real laser experiments. In radiation experiments, when testing hard-
ened designs or fault tolerant technologies, it is necessary to choose a set of stimuli
that minimizes silent faults. Faults silenced by the test vectors could hide a vul-
nerability in the design itself. Furthermore, a reduced version of FT-UNSHADES
(also known as FTUSB) hardware emulator was used during laser experiments to
apply stimuli to the DUT, and also as a coincidence detector comparing golden
outputs with those from the irradiated DUT to find failures.
First experiences with pulsed laser were carried out at the Faculty of Physics
of Salamanca (Spain) on a digital full-custom integrated circuit7 in a 0.5 microns
CMOS technology from a low cost educational foundry [105]. Results from these
experiments were published here [85] and the need for a test methodology to
identify and diagnose soft errors showed up for the first time in our research group.
Our test vehicle was fully designed in the Dept. of Electronics Engineering of
the University of Seville and have been targeted in different experiments. Latest
version was fabricated in a 130 nm CMOS process from STMicroelectronics. The
design behind this test vehicle is in the following referred to as JONIC (Jonathan
Tombs Integrated Circuit8)
Projects RENASER (Effects of Radiation on Aerospace Systems, An Investi-
gation on Emulation) and its continuation RENASER+ (Integral Analysis of Dig-
ital Circuits and Systems for Aerospace Applications) are funded by the Spanish
Science and Technology Inter-ministerial Commission (CYCIT) to boost research
in the field of radiation effects on semiconductors. The author’s expertise in parti-
7Description of the DUT design will be done later in the chapters related to the experimental
tests.
8This circuit was named JONIC in memory of Prof. Jonathan Tombs
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cle accelerator tests has been acquired in the frame of these two projects through
several experiences at the National Accelerators Center (CNA) based in Sevilla,
Spain. Early experiences at the 18-MeV Cyclotron [107] showed that experimen-
tal setup at ion radiation facilities is not trivial, and a number of best practices
must be followed in order to achieve valid results. Later experiments were carried
out at the 3 MV Tandem Van der Graaf accelerator using the micro-probe end line
for high focusing of the beam. All the radiation tests where commanded by the
FTUSB platform. The success in the use of this platform led to the use of the full
FT-UNSHADES emulator for the key experiment on this Thesis.
The JEDEC STANDARD JESD89A states in section 3.3.3 a difference be-
tween static and dynamic testing. Through several irradiation experiences within
the aforementioned Projects, different static and dynamic tests were done over the
JONIC design in both 0.5 µm and 0.13 µm chips. In the context of this Thesis,
static tests are those in which device is not clocked but frozen in a given logi-
cal state when irradiated, this is the way SRAM memories are tested. Dynamic
Testing on the other hand, applies when the device is running while irradiated.
For ASICs, dynamic testing is preferable to study the behavior of the chip in nor-
mal operation under radiation. Results from Dynamic testing on a rather simple
design as JONIC show that a methodology for diagnosis and verification of soft
errors is required. The main purpose of the methodology developed in this thesis
is to address the next to issues:
• Soft Error Validation. Ion beam is the definitive test for part validation
against radiation and components must be certified in such complex facili-
ties. Furthermore, it would be desirable to perform dynamic testing in many
cases to represent the normal operation of the component to be evaluated.
The problem of observability in these experiments is well known, since de-
vices performs as black boxes where only output ports are registered. Even
though it is possible to detect failures by comparison with expected outputs,
it is not evident to relate them with single-bit SEU-like faults or with any
other causes like MCU or transient power cut off. An observed failure can
be produced in a real experiment for many other causes even not directly
related with radiation but with the usually complex experimental setup. For
this reason, the experimenter needs to be sure about what he is observing,
as stated in JEDEC STANDARD JESD89A-1A, Section 6 (“Failure Crite-
ria”): Any result that does not match expectation is a possible soft error and
shall be recorded. If a possible error is identified, action should be taken to
verify that it is a soft error.
• Failure Diagnosis. Maximum focusing in laser experiments is near 1 square
micron in top-side irradiation. It helps to identify the origin of the damage
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spatially, not so in the temporal dimension. However, in ion beam radiation
experiments, it is much more difficult to determine the origin or cause giving
place to the observed failures. In ESA/SCC Basic Specification No. 25100
entitled “Single Event Test Methods and Guidelines” section 4.2.1, it can be
read: The test software shall be capable of logging the number of upsets, the
location and the time. Knowing about origins of failures or diagnosing then
become important from the designer’s point of view to evaluate reliability of
hardening solutions or technologies [93]. As said before, the need of knowl-
edge about the origin of soft errors in dynamic tests of ASIC or other logic
circuits arose naturally in radiation experiments, even in laser experiments,
where all the experimental variables are much more controlled.
Therefore, the scope of this thesis is in developing a technique for soft error
validation and failure diagnosis to enhance observability in radiation experiments
of digital circuits, providing a methodology not bound to specific platforms or
tools. The tools and resources deployed in this Thesis are not optimal but only
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2.1 Introduction
The study of soft errors in digital circuits is commonly constrained to SRAM
and DRAM devices due to a higher sensitivity per part area. However, deep sub-
micron technologies are sensitive enough, and soft errors in circuital core logic
must be considered [42, 101], like SETs and SEUs in internal registers.
This chapter is a first approach to radiation testing of digital circuits intro-
ducing ground-level experiments to predict SER. Moreover, some examples of
dynamic radiation tests are commented where the technique of detection and di-
agnosis developed in this thesis would be applicable.
In-lab radiation testing is the final procedure for hardness assurance of compo-
nents designed to work in harsh radiation environments or validation of Commer-
cial Off the Shelf (COTS) parts to be flown in space missions. Radiation tests on
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enhanced radiation background to induce soft errors, are in the group of Acceler-
ated Soft Error Rate (ASER) techniques. These techniques make the target device
undergo a high radiation exposition under controlled energy, flux and fluence. Pre-
diction for component reliability must be made by extrapolation depending on the
in-orbit radiation environment. This is the common procedure for researchers and
radiation engineers. On the other hand, System Soft Error Rate (SSER) consists of
irradiation of a high number of devices in the radiation environment similar to the
environment of operation of the chip. This method is also known as field testing
and is usually related to industrial validation of components.
Microelectronic parts have to be qualified against radiation attending to the
component use. The rate of soft error events in orbit for a given component can be
calculated from the in-lab response to radiation and the environmental radiation
conditions expected when the component is on duty (mainly the particle fluence
versus LET). For heavy ions, ground tests have to cover the full range of LET
by trying different Z and energies for ions in a particle accelerator. Robustness
against neutrons must be tested with neutron sources, for example for avionics
[104], and high energy proton irradiation has to be considered for certain space
missions due to the predominant presence of these ions in space.
The methodology presented in this thesis is introduced and proposed as an
improvement in the visibility of the results of ASER radiation experiments for
dynamic radiation tests. Instead of memories, tested statically, other logic devices
like microprocessors or digital ASICs have to be tested under run to get confidence
in the SER estimations. It has been demonstrated that static radiation tests of these
devices could lead to overestimation in the SER predictions [15, 108].
2.2 SEE Computer Simulation
Computer simulation of SEE on semiconductor devices is recommendable when
facing radiation experiments, specially in low energy accelerators. For a given
technology, it is necessary to estimate whether the accelerator facility is in the
range of LET needed to observe SEE effects or not. Moreover, selecting the ion
specie and energy required depending on the objectives of the experiment, is a key
first step and must not be improvised. This section is a brief introduction to a set
of different simulation techniques.
The author of this thesis has been involved in computer simulation of SEE
prior to face the accelerator experiments carried out for this thesis at the CNA
3MV Van der Graaf facility [71, 87]. Preliminary SEE experiments involving old
CMOS 0.5 µm technology in this particle accelerator resulted in an upper bound
for the maximum achievable bit-flip capability in this low energy accelerator, ded-
icated mainly to Ion Beam Analysis (IBA) techniques. These experiences allowed
54
2.2 SEE Computer Simulation
us to address further experiments in the scope of this thesis, over a test vehicle
developed on the newer CMOS 0.13 µm technology.
A work done on the simulation of the PIPB effect on a CMOS 0.13 µm [68] is
mentioned later in Chapter 5, Section 5.7, to establish an upper bound for the de-
vice clock frequency in order to avoid SET errors in the SEU radiation experiment
carried out for this thesis.
The following subsections are a brief introduction to the simulation methodol-
ogy adopted to estimate the LET range necessary to induce soft errors in a given
technology.
2.2.1 SPICE
During the design phase, engineers can take advantage of the tools provided by
design suites for spice simulation, to get a first estimation of the effects of radiation
in a given circuitry topology [29]. The common approach consists of placing a
pulsed current source in a sensitive node to trigger a discharge in the same way
that it occurs after ion striking or laser irradiation [91]. For a CMOS transistor
in off state, charge from ionizing radiation establish electrical paths in the bulk
silicon, allowing charge from the drain node to be evacuated and dropping voltage
at this node. This rapid voltage excursion in some circumstances can induce a flip
in the logic value of a SRAM cell, for example.
The current pulse depends on several factors and there are different analytical
















Parameter Qtot is the total charge evacuated resulting from integration of the
curve between 0 and ∞. Parameters τr and τf are the characteristic rise and fall
characteristic times of the double exponential. Typical values for these parameters
are:
τf = 100ps (2.2)
τr = 100fs (2.3)
These values are related to the response of the semiconductor to the generated
charge. Fast drift currents appear in the depleted region due to the high electrical
fields, contributing to the steep rise in the current pulse in Figure 2.1. The long-
term decay in the curve is due to the diffusion of carriers through the bulk, also






















Figure 2.1: Pulsed current shaping to simulate the currents appearing after ion or
laser irradiation close to the nodes of a MOS transistor. *Note: Time
is in logarithmic scale, so rise time is orders of magnitude shorter
than fall time.
Putting this pulsed current source in a critical node and sweeping the parame-
ter Qtot during SPICE simulation it is possible to find the threshold value for Qtot
inducing the flip of a SRAM cell for a given technology. This parametric analysis
in Figure 2.2 shows a threshold value for Qtot of near 510 fC (green line). This
value is a rough first approximation for Qcrit an can be considered when no more
precision is required. This value is directly related to the charge generated by ion-
ization, but it is not exactly the same; there are loses by recombination and an
amplification effect caused by a parasitic BJT transistor in CMOS devices, which
can be about 30-40% of Qtot [27].
The value Qcrit obtained by this method is a hint or educated guess for the
simulation procedures introduced in next section.
2.2.2 SRIM
The Bethe formula describes the ionizing energy loss of a charged particle (proton,
alpha particle or ion, not electron) as it passes through matter. The relativistic





















Formula 2.4 considers the charged particle completely stripped of electrons
and is not a good approximation for slow or high-Z ions. Linhard-Scharff-Schiott
56
2.2 SEE Computer Simulation
Figure 2.2: SPICE parametric simulation to find the threshold value of Qtot in
equation 2.1 giving place to bit-flip
(LSS) Theory improves the theoretical treatment of the ion-matter interaction in-
cluding a complete model for the dependence of the charge state of the ion on its
velocity as it travels through matter.
The software Stopping Range of Ions in Matter (SRIM [114]) is a powerful
tool based on Monte Carlo simulation for the study of ions passing through matter
including all the theoretical knowledge in this field since the Bethe formula. This
tool is rather simple and is widely used by the radiation effects community [63,
64, 113].
The output of the simulator is, among other data, the direct ionizing energy
deposition of the ion along the track. This linear energy transfer can be converted
approximately to charge by means of the energy necessary to create an electron-
hole pair. In Silicon it is:
Ee−h = 3.6eV (2.5)
It is necessary to know the ion range, energy deposition by direct ionization
and also the critical volume of charge collection in the semiconductor in order to
compute the amount of charge generated. That is basic to make estimations on the
total charge drained from a neighbour capacitive node. Range and energy depo-
sition of the ion can be extracted from SRIM calculation if a proper layer model
of the target is used. The collection volume or sensitive volume depends on the
targeted technology, for a CMOS 130 nm bulk silicon technology the collection
depth is around 1 micron [6]. For older CMOS technologies like AMIS C5 [105]
with 0.5 µm feature size, the critical depth can be around 3 µm and has to be
taken into account to obtain the net charge in the sensitive region.
As an example, Figure 2.3 shows the SRIM LET calculated for a 12 MeV
Mg ion on an AMIS C5 [105] target modeled by the layers in table 2.1. Several
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Figure 2.3: Linear Energy Transfer profile for a 12 MeV Mg ion passing through
a simplified layer model of the AMIS C5 technology.
simulations for different ions and energies result in table 2.2. Recalling the result
from SPICE simulations, these results suggest that for a 0.5 µm CMOS technol-
ogy, 50 MeV S ions or higher are required to flip the logic. This is not feasible
for the cocktail of ions and energies available at the 3 MV electrostatic accelera-
tor at the CNA facilities. However, more accurate TCAD simulations lowered the
estimation for the required LET [67].
As discussed later in section 5.6, the use of SRIM simulations led to define
the proper ion specie and energy for the radiation experiment carried out in this
thesis.
Material Thickness Density (g/cm3)
Oxide (SiO2) 1.5µm 2.200
Metal1 (Al) 0.94µm 2.702
Substrate 6µm 2.321
Table 2.1: Layer model of an AMIS C5 device
2.2.3 TCAD
Technology Computer Aided Design (TCAD) [99] is a suite of software tools
for the simulation of technology processes and semiconductor devices. Three-
dimensional solid state physics equations involving charge carriers and electric
fields in the semiconductor are solved by numerical methods. For semiconductor
device simulations, the main equations involved are the non-linear Poisson equa-
tion (eq. 2.6) and the continuity equation (eq. 2.7).
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Table 2.2: Charge deposition in the layer model of an AMIS C5 device.
The 3D model of the device is complex and incorporates all the structure,
doping profiles and characteristic concentrations to a given technology. For the
first time a technology is going to be put under the beam to test reliability, it
makes sense to simulate the response of the device to a given ion available at the
accelerator facility. It becomes mandatory for older technologies and low energy
accelerators for SEU experiments, for example.
∇ · ε∇φ = −q (p− n+ND −NA)− ρtrap (2.6)




New technologies show up effects never detected before in older technology
nodes, as it occurs when dealing with SET [61] for 0.35 µm CMOS and newer.
To check the capability of the 3MV Tandem Van der Graaf accelerator at the
CNA to accelerate ions with LET over the bit-flip threshold, a thorough simulation
study was done on a well-known 0.5 µm CMOS bulk technology1. It was followed
by an assessment on the available high energetic ions at the CNA. Spice-TCAD
mixed-mode simulations resulted in the validation of the facility and different
radiation experiments showed that prediction from simulation were right. Results
were reported in [89]. Nevertheless, the test vehicle used as proof of concept for
this thesis has been fabricated in a 0.13 µm CMOS bulk technology, therefore
having lower LET threshold for bit-flip than that for the 0.5 µm. Validation of the
3MV Tandem Van der Graaf to induce bit-flips in the 0.5 µm technology has been
shown to be an upper bound for SEU generation when testing technologies with
smaller feature sizes.
Figure 2.4 is the basic SRAM cell for Spice-TCAD simulation. TCAD sup-
ports a tunable heavy ion model, and transients simulations can be run on voltages
at nodes A and B. It is useful to get the LET profile leading to the flip of the cell.
1A 3D model for a transistor in this technology was profusely studied and precisely calibrated
by the author [67].
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Figure 2.4: SRAM cell for mixed simulation Spice-TCAD to estimate the LET
threshold for bit-flip.
A transient simulation is plotted in Figure 2.5 using the estimated LET profile
for a 12 MeV Mg ion. The title of the graph means that, for the ion energy, LET
actually depends on depth with a lateral profile that can be obtained by SRIM sim-
ulation (see 2.2.2). The light green line represents the charge current at the struck
node, showing a sharp peak due to fast drift current, as mentioned before. Voltage
at node A is represented by the black line, and voltage at node B is represented
by the red line. The transient simulation clearly shows the flip of the SRAM cell
for the given ion. These simulations were very valuable to establish a “LET of
reference” at the CNA.
2.3 Radiation Testing
2.3.1 Cross-Sections
Cross-section studies are the most used for component characterization against
soft error and can take advantage of signature analysis as a way to apply failure
criteria. A typical cross-section curve is shown in Figure 2.6 for SEE in micro-











































Figure 2.5: Mixed-mode transient simulation for the strike of 12 MeV Mg ion
on the cell of Figure 2.4.
probability of finding SEE errors depending on the incident ion LET.
The cross-section data are commonly fitted to a Weibull curve with a low-
LET threshold, a knee and a saturation region. In some cases, data plots include
error bars accounting for some uncertainty in the number of faults computed for a
given LET. This uncertainty is related to the lack of confidence in the cause of the
observed error. For this reason, cross-section studies require a method for failure
classification or validation.
2.3.2 Proton Beams
High energy protons are the most predominant particles in the cosmic ray back-
ground in space. Protons are also predominant in solar wind and in the Van Allen
inner belt. Even for relatively high energetic protons the associated LET is rather
low, and rarely in space protons induce SEE by direct ionization [78]. Protons may
also interact with nuclei triggering nuclear reactions giving place to recoiling nu-
clei (elastic collisions) or reaction products (inelastic) that can be highly ionizing
particles.
SEE Cross-sections for protons are obtained by gradually increasing the pro-
ton energy from energies below the nuclear reaction threshold which is close to 3
MeV [50], to energies in the saturation region of the cross section, near 100 MeV.
Depending on the device sensitivity to SEE and proton energy, it must be nec-
essary a high fluence to get a representative amount of errors which can lead to
TID damage. It is recommendable to estimate firstly the accumulated dose during
the SEE test and, previous to the experiment, put the device in a 60Co gamma
source to check the reliability of the device. TID damage can be monitored by
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Figure 2.6: Cross section vs. LET curve. Y-axis represents the probability of
having SEE per unit area and incident ion. The X-axis is the ion
LET. Source: The Aerospace Corporation.
measuring leakage currents, power consumption or other failures. Early experi-
ences at the Cyclotron facility at CNA [107] (in Figure 2.7) irradiating a pro-
grammable logic device resulted in dose damage during dynamic tests. In this
case, the output errors were not clearly determined as SEE errors as long as the
errors were detected by coincidence with a golden output, instead of using signa-
ture analysis to compute the whole error patterns.
2.3.3 Neutron Tests
Fast Neutrons are a major source of soft errors at atmospheric altitudes. Civil
aviation systems and even ground-level electronics equipments are susceptible
to be affected by these particles originated by cosmic ray interaction with atmo-
spheric molecule. Low energy neutrons interact mainly with some specific el-
ements present traditionally in the semiconductor technology. The most known
reaction is that with the 10B isotope in the borophosphosilicate glass (BPSG) of
SRAM devices. However, this element was removed from the process flow on the
CMOS SRAM 180 nm node [11] so the SEE contribution from neutrons below 1
MeV is negligible in modern technologies.
Neutron source facilities are of main interest for the radiation effects com-
munity to study the effects of neutrons in modern technology nodes, as long as
ground electronics go deeper and deeper into the semiconductor nanoscale. There
are works demanding for a way of validation of SEU or other SEE errors in dy-
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Figure 2.7: Cyclotron at the CNA. Protons were accelerated to 18 MeV for a
first dynamic radiation experiment on a Xilinx CPLD [107].
namic radiation tests of logic devices as for example [47].
2.3.4 Pulsed Laser Method
Laser testing is a mature technique for SEE fault injection on semiconductor de-
vices. Pulsed laser facilities have been longer used to emulate the effects of ion-
izing particles present in space or other radioactive environments. Probably the
main advantage of these facilities is the reduced cost of use when compared with
particle accelerators, and also the controlability of the experimental conditions. In
the Single Photon Absorption (SPA) approach, the laser can be focused to a small
area (approx. 1µm) in the circuit under test to study hot spots in the layout. How-
ever, metal layers are highly reflective and in technologies with more than 2 or 3
metal layers the irradiation is performed from the bottom side of the silicon die,
exploiting non-linear interactions with Silicon via Two Photon Absorption (TPA).
Hence, SPA is only used for very old technology nodes. The sample preparation
for the TPA approach is not straightforward and is possibly the main drawback
of the technique. Nevertheless, these techniques are of extensive use in different
researches as in the study of charge sharing or the PIPB effect through logic gates,
for example.
Signature analysis is used in [103] to diagnose faults and evaluate mitigation
strategies in a high speed bulk Si/Ge technology under laser irradiation. This tech-
nology features high robustness against total dose damage, but it is actually very
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sensitive to SEE errors, so hardening by design strategies must be considered and
tested. In this context, diagnostic during irradiation is necessary. Other laser ex-
periments to generate dynamic cross sections in digital ASIC were carried out in
[85]. Here, software VHDL simulation was used after the experiments to analyze
error patterns and identify SEU faults in the circuit under test.
2.3.5 Ion Beams
Ion beam test is the definitive validation procedure for microelectronic compo-
nents against in-orbit heavy ion radiation. Light ions like alpha particles and
higher-Z species are also used in research to reproduce the effects of heavy ions
effects on electronics.
The following text is an excerpt from ESAPSS_01_609 section 19.2.1 refer-
ring to the simulation of space radiation in ground facilities like particle accelera-
tors:
“The differences between radiation conditions in space and their simulation
in the laboratory are frequently quite large[...] one must therefore modify the raw
short-term results of "simulation" tests when converting them into predictions of
space radiation conditions. One may also wish to monitor the irradiated device at
intervals of minutes, days and months and introduce factors to allow for qualita-
tive differences in space and laboratory radiation[...]
Despite the above mentioned problems, a surprisingly wide range of devices
can be tested suitably by the use of high-activity gamma-ray-emitting isotopes,
e.g. the well-known cobalt-60 hot cell or "irradiator". However, one must always
classify carefully the physics of the effect one is aiming to simulate - whether it
is classed as a total-dose ionization effect, permanent bulk damage effect single
event upset or a transient effect of some other kind.»”
This text summarizes some of the difficulties that the radiation engineer faces
when planning a radiation experiment in the context of ASER techniques. First,
results from accelerated tests must be extrapolated to achieve confidence with the
real error rate expected in orbit. Second, the effects of radiation on semiconductor
devices are very different in their nature and consequences, and depending on the
effects investigated, it is necessary to establish the proper conditions during the
experiment, mainly to avoid physical damage in the chip and dose rate or TID
effects.
Eventually, in-beam experiments are carried out in vacuum to avoid ion inter-
action with surrounding molecule. Devices under test must perform in an envi-
ronment with no heat dissipation on air, so temperature must be monitored if it is
expected to consume relative high currents during the experiment.
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2.3.5.1 Broad Beam
Broad beam is generally used for part qualification to have global statistical infor-
mation on device dependability. Broad beams require low focusing, so there are
few restrictions imposed by magnetic lenses on the ion LET, allowing the high-
est LET values and fluxes of particles. Heavy ion experiments are normally per-
formed in broad beam, and diagnostic on soft errors can be useful to find hotspots
in a wide exposed area, and also to guarantee that the observed errors are SEU or
other SEE errors.
2.3.5.2 Microprobe
Broad beam experiments with heavy ions are usually used in part qualification
testing against SEE, having generally the response of the whole component to the
radiation. However, for diagnostic purposes it is useful to control approximately
the beam location, and it is achieved by using nuclear microprobes. However, new
technology dimensions are shrinking and very often focused area covers several
cells in the layout. In this cases, diagnosis by signature analysis can add valuable
information about fault location for SEE.
2.4 Proposed Methodology for Soft Error Testing
Accelerated radiation experiments for soft error analysis are usually performed
to detect the vulnerabilities of a given component operating in a harsh radiation
environment. These experiments are usually costly, time-consuming and complex
and it would be desirable to get as much data as possible from beam sessions. Dy-
namic radiation testing introduces extra complexity to the test regarding the time
dimension. Data flow processing for error detection is not straightforward in most
cases and a testing protocol with a set of best-practices is required to enhance ex-
periment observability. This thesis comes to contribute with a procedure involving
fault injection campaigns and data analysis during radiation experiments, to bring
closer the roles of the designers and radiation engineers.
Figure 2.8 is a flow chart with the main steps in the proposed methodology.
The different blocks are deeply explained and proved in further chapters, but here
a global introduction is done.
The idea behind this methodology is to perform a SEE cause-effect analysis on
the design under test, generally previous to the radiation experiment, to record the
expected behavior of the circuit and generate a database or fault dictionary to be
used later for diagnosis. The starting point in the whole methodology is the netlist
or HDL description of the design to be tested. Attending to the flow chart in Fig-
ure 2.8, there are two branches well defined corresponding to the emulated fault
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injection campaign and to the radiation experiment. Each branch is independent
in time and can be completed separately. Of course, the test vectors are shared for
the two branches, to apply exactly the same set of stimuli to the DUT during the
emulation and radiation experiment.
Fault injection is performed via hardware emulation covering the whole de-
sign or just the blocks to be tested later during the radiation experiment. A fault
model have to be considered for a first generation of a soft error database (or fault
dictionary) according to the expected experimental conditions. By simplicity, a
first fault dictionary for SEU-like errors can be generated using the bit-flip model.
Faults are induced systematically and circuit outputs are processed to generate
signatures at each round of injection or “run”. In the fault dictionary, a single
signature is related to a given fault.
The radiation experiment is performed on a prototype from the design netlist
(Integrated Circuit). An Automated Test Equipment (ATE) controls the test by
applying continuously the set of stimuli and recording the outputs while the de-
vice is running and irradiated on the accelerator beam (or other radiation facility).
Outputs are processed in the same way as during the emulation fault injection
campaign to get the signatures. For the output failures, the resulting signatures are
looked up in the fault dictionary. In the event that signatures are all present in the
dictionary, all the errors can be diagnosed. In other case, a new fault dictionary
must be generated considering for example SET-like or MBU-like errors. This
procedure is the main contribution of this thesis.
There also exists the possibility of using the technique in a effect-cause anal-
ysis. Instead of generating an exhaustive fault dictionary, the radiation test can be
carried out and failure recorded to later investigate the causes by fault injection
in the hardware emulator. Knowing the experimental conditions can help to re-
duce the candidate nodes to be injected, and also the fault model to be used (SEU,
MBU, MCU, etc..).
In addition to reliability analysis of ASICs, there are a wide variety of studies
involving Soft Errors induced by radiation where fault dictionaries and signature
analysis could be applied. Programmable devices are generating rising interest
from aerospace industry. Regarding radiation of programmable devices, and con-
cerning this methodology, the limitation is in the configuration state of the com-
ponent. Configuration must be non-sensitive to radiation, as for example in the
One-Time Programmable (OTP) or flash-based FPGAs. Flash-based FPGAs con-
figuration switches are non-sensitive to SEE but not so the logic associated to the
implemented design, which is vulnerable to soft errors [95], this way radiation of
these devices keeps functionality safe and errors come only from the design imple-
mented. Flash-based FPGAs are an interesting framework for dependable designs
to be tested in-beam before fabricating the final prototype. SRAM FPGAs are a
particular case considered for future work in Section 7.2, where the configuration
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Figure 2.8: Flow chart of the proposed approach.
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state is sensitive to radiation.
Another field of study where detection and diagnosis can be of interest is in
SET mitigation topologies in antifuse FPGAs like the Actel RTAX-S devices.
These OTP FPGA devices present SEU-hardened user registers with Triple Mod-
ular Redundancy (TMR) protection. However, ion beam tests have demonstrated
they are vulnerable to SET even for frequencies down to 6 MHz [96]. In this case,
soft errors are induced in form of SET that are sampled at the user registers and
can be cataloged.
If the layout of the DUT is accessible, microprobe analysis can be applied
in a given topology to find the error dependence on experimental variables as
temperature, bias voltage or flux in a similar way as in [100], signature analysis
here would provide a failure criteria.
2.5 Remarks on This Chapter
Along this chapter, a number of simulation and radiation testing techniques have
been discussed that are relevant for the rest of this thesis. These techniques also
complement the methodology introduced in this chapter, which is the main con-
tribution of this thesis. There is a number of journal and conference papers coau-
thored by the author of this thesis that turned to be crucial for the development of
the ideas and experiments that are the basements of the thesis.
SEE have been simulated using TCAD models in [33] and the SEU threshold
is investigated and experimentally verified in [88].
Laser experiments have been helpful to estimate some critical experimental
parameters and design vulnerabilities. A thorough study on the capabilities of
TCAD to simulate ionization by pulsed laser is done in [86]. A method to estimate
the critical charge for a CMOS technology in laser experiments is explained in
[82] and also the simulation of a bit-flip induced by pulsed laser in [87].
One step forward, in [84] a complete laser test-bench is set up for the analysis
of SEE and a cross section analysis is done in [83].
Transient propagation have been also investigated by TCAD simulation in [68]
to measure the broadening effect in a 130nm CMOS technology. Results are valid
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3.1 Introduction
This chapter is introducing Signature Analysis as a way to detect and diagnose
circuit failures and its application in radiation tests. The applicability of this tech-
nique for diagnosis of consumer electronic equipment has proven to be successful
from long ago, with the advent of test tools addressed to electronic designers in-
stead of quality assurance engineers [43].
Recording failure signatures is recommended in the standard JEDEC JESD89
about soft errors induced in semiconductors, in Section 3.6 entitled “Data Collec-
tion”. The state of a digital circuit is fully deterministic for a given set of stimuli
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and initial state. This feature makes it possible for logic circuits to establish per-
manent cause-effect relationships between the observed outputs and the internal
state of the circuit.
Considering a classic Moore or Mealy Machine, fault injection in a logic cir-
cuit in general can be considered as an additional stimuli that changes the internal
state of the machine putting the circuit on an unwanted state. This can be expressed
with the following equations:
S(t+ 1) = Θ(S(t), I(t), ξ(t)) (3.1)
O(t+ 1) = Π(S(t), I(t), ξ(t)) (3.2)
The internal state of the digital circuit is given by S(t) and the corresponding
outputs are represented by O(t). The function modeling internal faults is ξ(t),
with normal circuit operation corresponding to ξ(t) being non-present or null.
For a given input stimuli I(t), signature analysis is performed by processing the
sequence of O(t) corresponding to a set of faults modeled by ξ(t).
A tradeoff exists in signature analysis to produce small enough signatures
while keeping low the probability of having repeated signatures for different se-
quences of O(t). In other words, the smaller the signature is, the greater the prob-
ability of having repeated signatures for different sequences of O(t). Another key
point is finding the proper model function ξ(t) for the expected faults during radi-
ation experiments.
Minimizing signature size is mandatory for medium-large circuits with large
sets of stimuli, in order to reduce memory usage. For example, as can be read in
[3], for a campaign of up to 2 million faults injected on the unprotected Leon2
processor, just 17% of these runs were detected at the outputs for a given test
bench with 275000 vectors. In this case, the signature database would consist of
340000 signatures indexing the faulty runs, which means roughly 6 MB of data.
This amount of memory is negligible when compared with the amount of data
digested by the signature function during the whole campaign, close to 256 GB.
The fault model used to emulate the effects of radiation before the radiation
experiment must be carefully chosen in relation to experimental conditions. For
the study of soft errors in digital circuits, the simplest ξ(t) function at the Register
Transfer Level consists of inducing single bit-flips in the design, to emulate the
effect of a particle hit affecting only a given FF.
This chapter is devoted to describe the use of a signature function in the normal
work-flow of hardware emulators and radiation test equipment. The main ideas
were exposed in the RADECS Conference held in Seville in September 2011 [70].
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3.2 Use of Signature Analysis for Soft Error Testing
The use of signature analysis for error detection and diagnosis in electronic cir-
cuits, components or equipments is usual for the test community. In the field of
radiation effects on component and systems, there are works in the use of signa-
ture analysis for detecting and diagnosis of errors in electronic affected by SEE as
in [80], addressed to find errors in the program control flow of a microprocessor
system, or involving error diagnosis in SRAM FPGAs [75]. The concept underly-
ing to signature analysis is the generation of unique and simple codes that identify
certain amount of data.
In dynamic radiation testing of digital circuits, the data flow at the outputs of a
digital circuit during normal operation can be processed by a signature function to
generate a unique code or signature. Under normal operation, in absence of errors,
the output data pattern will be always the same, and so the signature associated.
However, output soft errors modify the error-free data flow and can be associated
to a different unique signature.
The two basic requirements for a given signature function to be used for error
detection and diagnosis are the following:
1. Determinism
2. Collisionless
A given data flow or data buffer must always generate exactly the same signa-
ture, so it must be fully deterministic. Furthermore, for exact diagnosis, the signa-
ture function should be collisionless, that means that different data flows must pro-
duce different signatures. No signature function can guarantee to be completely
collisionless, but the probability of finding collisions can be reduced extremely in
order to achieve confidence in the uniqueness of signatures. Figure 3.1 depicts sig-
nature generation for an error-free data flow (top) and for a data flow containing
soft errors (bottom).
First experiences in Spain with an ultra-short pulsed laser1 used to induce
soft errors dynamically in a digital circuit [85], showed that the cause of failures
should be unambiguously identified for a proper assessment of the origin of errors.
In static radiation tests of SRAM memories, it is straightforward to determine the
location of injected faults from the observed errors, but dynamic testing produces
eventually complex failure patterns that must be correlated carefully with an in-
ternal fault or upset.
Figure 3.2 is a screenshot from a Modelsim simulation of the aforementioned
pulsed laser experiment. This was the first approach to identify observed errors af-
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Figure 3.1: Figure on the top represents the normal data flow from the DUT
output port and the associated hexadecimal signature or golden sig-
nature. Figure on the bottom represents the circuit operating under
radiation, an erroneous data flow (the error pattern is shadowed) and
the associated anomalous signature.
ter laser irradiation, consisting on recording data in the laboratory and later com-
paring the error pattern obtained to a software simulated fault injection. The test
platform for these experiments was based in a FPGA-based coincidence detec-
tor known as FTUSB, recording discrepancies between golden and faulty outputs
during irradiation.
The waveforms in Figure 3.2 show the detection of an error in three outputs of
the target, and the time it’d take for the coincidence detector to record the events.
As can be seen, an error appears firstly at SR out and later in the simulation, two
errors appear simultaneously at PS Out 1 and PS out 2. After an error is detected,
several FPGA clock cycles are required to process and record the necessary data
about the error while the DUT is paused (see how the corresponding waveform for
the Iteration cycle is frozen in some intervals). This mode of operation is not the
best for dynamic testing because during these time lapses, the circuit is irradiated
statically so the test is not completely dynamic (of course, the time the circuit is
paused is relatively small in comparison to the complete set of stimuli). It would
be much more appropriate to use the time between runs to record error data and
avoid interruptions in the normal execution of the DUT.
For this purpose, signature generation does not interfere with the normal op-
eration of the target circuit and signatures are produced on the fly in an external
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Figure 3.2: Modelsim simulation of a bit-flip induced by pulsed laser irradiation
of a digital circuit [85]. The method for error detection in this case
was a coincidence detector designed to be a reduced version of FT-
UNSHADES [3] for radiation experiments.
fore, the test is never paused and circuit errors are always induced dynamically.
Signature generation provides information about the whole error pattern no matter
how many cycles it takes, and the number of bits required per signature is fixed.
3.3 Signature Module
There are many different algorithms for signature generation that could be appar-
ently well-suited for a given device and set of test vectors. However, together with
the basic requirements noted in the previous section, it is necessary to observe a
number of recommendations in order to get the expected results:
1. Small Signatures
2. Reduced Hardware Requirements
3. Low Propagation Delay
4. High Data Rate
Generation of exhaustive fault dictionaries normally requires the storage of a
large amount of signatures, therefore it is recommendable for the signature mod-
ule to produce signatures as simple as possible. Of course, the problem with small
signatures is in the collision probability because larger signatures are statistically
more robust to collisions. Another point is the hardware requirement for the imple-









Figure 3.3: Signature time delay Td compared to the system clock period Tc.
easily implanted in existing hardware emulators and ATEs, it is recommendable
for the signature module to be tiny and portable. For the use of FT-UNSHADES,
the module must be implemented in the system FPGA sharing resources with two
instances of the DUT and some extra logic, so the area overhead must be minimal.
The propagation delay is the amount of time it takes for the signature function
to refresh the signature value from the current circuit outputs. The outputs from
a digital circuit can change every clock cycle, so the propagation delay must be
shorter than a clock cycle. Figure 3.3 illustrates this situation by comparing the
propagation delay (Td) to the clock period (Tc). The propagation delay for the
signature is short enough to have a stable signature after each clock cycle, so the
system can operate to the rated clock frequency.
The propagation delay could be a limitation for the system clock, specially in
the study of SET errors when the clock frequency has to be relatively high. Hence,
for SET studies, propagation delay should be a major concern in the election of a
signature module.
Another recommended feature for the signature function is having high data
rate. This recommendation is for circuits having a high number of output ports,
to preserve the clock frequency. The problem of having multiple output ports can
also be solved by placing in parallel several instances of signature functions with
low number of inputs.
An additional recommendation, related to a possible future line of study for
the signature module, is the suitability to be hardened by design against radiation,
because in future test vehicles the module could be implemented in silicon as part
of a Built-in Self-Test (BIST) strategy.
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Figure 3.4: Graph illustrating some features of hash functions.
3.4 Hash Functions
Among the possible candidates to implement a signature module in the workflow
of a radiation test equipment or hardware fault injector, hash functions are here
proposed to be a recommended choice. Nevertheless, the use of other approaches
based on Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) codes for example, it is not discarded
and it is not the purpose of this thesis to propose the best possible solution, since
it can be very dependent on the specific experimental conditions (circuit complex-
ity, set of test vectors, number of outputs, SET analysis, etc...). Hash functions
are powerful and in many cases introduce no significant area overhead in FPGA
designs. Moreover, there are a variety of algorithms for different characteristics of
the circuit to be tested. Hash functions are widely used to check data integrity in
large files, data encryption, table look-up and others. There are also plenty of work
available about hardware implementation and optimization of hash functions for
FPGA devices, which is generally the main component in hardware emulators.
Figure 3.4 shows some features of hash functions that are relevant to be used
as signature module for soft error detection and diagnosis. As can be seen, no
matter the size of the incoming message, the resultant signature (hash sum) has
a fixed size. Hence, the hash signature is not dependent on the size of the set of
stimuli.
Hash functions are designed in most cases to provide very different signatures
even when the output error sequence is similar to other, specially in the case of
cryptographic hash functions. This feature may help to distinguish between signa-
tures even for data streams that are very similar. A single bit change in a megabyte
of data processed from the circuit outputs can give place to a very different hash
code.
There are several hash algorithms in the bibliography suitable to be used for
signature generation in the context of radiation testing of electronic components.
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Among the cryptographic hash functions, we can find MD, SHA or RIPEMD [98],
offering high robustness against collision. Another suitable non-cryptographic
hash functions are Pearson hashing, Jenkin or Fowler-Noll-Vo (FNV) hash func-
tions [55].
Collisions in hash functions are found when two or more different hash inputs
(messages) give place to the same hash code. If it happens when generating the
fault dictionary, the resulting hash table is no longer an 1-to-1 relationship, and the
fault dictionary would offer a list of fault candidates causing a given hash code. Of
course, two identical output data sequences coming from different fault injection
runs will also lead to the same hash code.
To estimate the probability of collision in an ideal collision resistant hash func-
tion, one may consider the birthday paradox to keep in mind that the probability
of finding a collision is around 50% for 2Nb/2 messages digested, where Nb is the
number of bits of the hash code. That means that a hash function producing 32-bit
wide hashes allows 64k messages to be digested with a 50% probability of finding
one collision. Then a 64-bit wide hash function has the same probability for up to
4G messages which should be enough for whatever design and test. Small designs
and small sets of test vectors will require a lower Nb than complex designs.
This thesis introduces the use of hash codes to index pairs of time and location
for each injected error, so that the hash function has to guarantee that there is no
collision for the fault injection campaign. There are powerful but simple enough
algorithms that can generate a hash code using a very reduced amount of circuitry.
The minimalist FNV hash function [81] is proposed for the practical examples in
this thesis as proof of concept because it complies the requirements of simplic-
ity and speed. The main advantage of this algorithm is that it is fast and can be
implemented in a small FPGA using very low hardware resources. We use here
the FNV-1 variant to produce 32-bit hashes, the input is one byte wide and it can
digest one input per clock cycle. For circuits with a higher number of outputs the
basic FNV cell can be cloned to process a higher number of bytes and generate a
wider hash value just joining the outputs of all the cells.
Following section is a comparison between two different hash function imple-
mentations in a FPGA to see the convenience of using one or another.
3.5 Fowler-Noll-Vo Versus RIPEMD160 Hash Func-
tions
The non-cryptographic FNV hash function is a very simple but powerful algorithm
for mapping input messages to 32 or 64 bit codes. The input port is 8-bit wide and
it produces a new hash code at every clock cycle. Robustness against collisions
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Figure 3.5: A stage of the cryptographic hash function RIPEMD160.
is not high and depends statistically on the number of incoming messages. In the
context of fault injection campaigns, that is to say the number of runs required to
complete the fault dictionary.
On the other side, the cryptographic hash function RIPEMD-160 is rather
more complex, with several stages and robust against collisions. RIPEMD-160 is
a strengthened version of RIPEMD. The hash codes generated are 160-bit wide,
which is 16 or 8 times the size of the FNV codes. The input port is 512-bit wide,
so it can be connected to the outputs of a digital circuit with up to such a number
of output ports. In this case, hash codes are not ready in just one clock cycle, and
the inputs must be present for a number of clock cycles. This is a limitation on the
maximum clock frequency for the circuit under test, but can be saved by buffering
if the number of output ports in the circuit is well below 512.
This two examples are probably antagonist, and are discussed here to show
two different solutions for different requirements. For a simple circuit with a rel-
atively small set of test vectors, the FNV option can work properly and is easily
implemented. Complex designs with a heavy workload could require the use of a
better performance hash function to guarantee no collisions. Anyway, selection of
the hash function shouldn’t be critical.




for each octet_of_data to be hashed
hash = hash x FNV_prime
hash = hash XOR octet_of_data
return hash
whereFNV _offset_basis is the seed of the algorithm,FNV _prime spreads
any small change in the input among the output hash bits and octet_of_data is
the input byte from the message to be hashed. This algorithm has proven to be
effective for signature analysis for radiation experiments as seen in the following
chapters. The FNV algorithm starts with a fixed offset value that is multiplied by a
seed word. The result is then XORed with the incoming 8-bit word to get the hash
code. This hash code is used as offset for the next word, so the final hash depends
on the complete sequence of data coming from the DUT every clock cycle.
A more complex implementation for a hash function is the cryptographic
RIPEMD-160. The algorithm in this case is given by a number of successive




bt = et−1 +ROLS [ft (bt−1, ct−1, dt−1) + at−1 +Xi +Kj]
at = et−1
Here, ROL is a Rotation-Left Operation, ft is a boolean function, Kj are
constants and Xi is a 32-bit word from the 512-bit input. See Appendix E for the
VHDL implementation of the algorithm developed for this study.
3.5.1 Implementation on an FPGA Device
Table 3.1 shows an implementation comparison of the FNV and RIPEMD-160
algorithms for different FPGA devices. All the data has been obtained using post
Place&Route analysis reports. The use of resources is minimal for the FNV hash
function as can be observed, with good timing specifications. It must be noted
that the number of FF required for the RIPEMD-160 in Virtex-2 platform has
been obtained with a previous version of the Xilinx synthesizer, which can explain
the area increase respect to other platforms. Although FNV is less robust against
collisions, it is more suitable for small designs because the implementation is
much smaller and it is faster, so it was the hash function selected for the fault
campaigns and radiation experiments. Moreover, although each FNV core can
only process one byte (8 outputs), it could be cloned to be used with designs
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with a higher number of outputs as a “compromise solution”. The VHDL for the
RIPEMD-160 pipeline architecture was developed from the description done in
[65] and as can be seen has the highest bit rate, so it is specially suited for a large
number of output ports and complex designs. Figure 3.6 shows the schematic after
the Xilinx synthesis tool for the FNV module. The main blocks are the multiplier
(top center) and the XOR gate (bottom left).
3.5.2 Pros and Cons
As mentioned before, the selection of the function to hash the output data flow
from the DUT is not critical. However, there are a number of points that must be
observed before making the choice among the comprehensive set of hash func-
tions available.
First, it is necessary to estimate the probability of having collisions due to
the hash algorithm. This probability is closely related to the spectrum of possible
faults to be injected in a given design and the workload. Of course, the higher
the number of FFs and clock cycles, the more complex must be a hash function
to be collisionless. The birthday paradox is a rough estimation to evaluate the
probability of collisions.
Hash functions with a uniform distribution of hash values and low number of
bits (32-bit hash codes) can be valuable for small-medium designs and a rather
small number of test vectors. It is recommendable to select the simplest option
complying with the collisionless requirement. The main advantages are in the
need of few resources from the configurable devices in the emulation platform.
Furthermore, it is easier to implement an VHDL description of a simple hash
function. Eventually, when a configurable device is shared by the DUT and the
hash block designs, reducing the resource requirements for the hash function im-
plies that more resources will be available for the DUT. In most cases, best timing
characteristics are achieved by simple hash functions like FNV rather than by
more complex algorithms.












































































































3.6 Remarks on This Chapter
When designs under test are large enough, and the number of test vectors make
the spectrum of possible faults huge, it could be necessary to proceed with a more
sophisticated hash function or even a cryptographic hash function to keep null
the collision probability. The problem here is the resources required and also the
availability of hardware descriptions for such algorithms. The resource require-
ments from RIPEMD-160 for example, seem to be prohibitive in case only one
configurable device must be shared by the DUT and the signature block.
The RIPEMD-160 algorithm can be fast enough if data flow coming from the
DUT is arranged properly. The pipeline architecture implemented to obtain Table
3.1 must be carefully used to take advantage of a high data throughput rate. This
fact makes less friendly the use of this kind of hash functions.
It can be good idea to follow a strategy based upon the concept of “divide
and conquer” to keep using simpler hash functions. There exists the possibility
of dividing the whole design in several pieces to have more than only one dictio-
nary. It could be also of interest to have the dictionary of only part of the design.
This strategy can be combined with selective focusing in a nuclear microprobe for
example.
3.6 Remarks on This Chapter
A preliminary use of signature analysis was done in [83] at the laser facilities of
the University of Salamanca. In that work, software simulation was used to get
error patterns after fault injection. These kind of experiments on digital circuits
irradiated dynamically, with the circuit running in normal operation, motivated
the use of signature analysis.
The first conference paper introducing part of the methodology described in
this thesis is [70]. The fault dictionary generation by fault injection is introduced
using a hash function to code the outputs from digital circuits. Experimental re-
sults were provided lately to validate the methodology and are discussed in sub-






“If a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it, does it make a sound?"
– Philosophical Thought Experiment
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4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the integration of a signature module in the work flow
of an specific hardware emulator as FT-UNSHADES, used for the generation of
dictionaries of faults, by mean of fault injection campaigns on different digital
designs. The process corresponds to the left branch on the complete flowchart of
the whole methodology, as can be seen in figure 4.1.
Four different digital designs have been used here to generate fault dictionaries
that could be used for diagnosis in radiation experiments. One of these designs is
used in further chapters for radiation testing.
Faults dictionaries are analyzed statistically to evaluate the suitability of the
workload for fault diagnosis, which depends on the number of faults that are ex-
actly identified by a single signature. This criterion for workload evaluation before
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the radiation experiment is a contribution of this thesis, providing a way to deter-
mine the set of test vectors more appropriate for a radiation experiment, in order
to avoid fault masking and to guarantee a high proportion of errors being perfectly
diagnosed.
4.2 Beam Test Mode of Operation
Another contribution of this thesis is the Beam Test Mode of Operation of the FT-
UNSHADES [3] emulator, developed to use the emulator as an ATE in a radiation
experiment. The work flow for this new mode of operation is exactly the same
than that for the generation of the fault dictionary, so that it is introduced in this
chapter.
In normal operation, FT-UNSHADES implements two replicas of the design
in the system FPGA, one to be injected and the other for cycle-by-cycle compari-
son. Fault injection is performed by read-modify-write of the FPGA configuration
bits by mean of partial reconfiguration of the FPGA. During each run of the test
vectors, the system clock stops and freezes the circuit on the injection selected
clock cycle, then the system reads from the configuration memory of the FPGA,
and sends the bit-stream to a host application running in a computer. The data is
then modified to inject a bit-flip in a desired FF by software, and afterward it is
downloaded to the FPGA to resume the run. In the event of an error detection
by comparison with a golden replica, the test is paused and results are sent back
to the computer, that proceeds with a new injection run. For each injection, the
system resets the circuit and starts again all the steps until all the faults have been
injected.
Figure 4.2 represents the original process flow of FT-UNSHADES with the
extra modules required for signature generation. The hash function can be easily
synthesized in the system FPGA to digest the outputs coming from the SEU-MUT.
The corresponding dictionary is processed in the computer with the recorded sig-
natures and annotations about the clock cycle and injected FF for each run.
It is relevant to note that, in the context of signature analysis, cycle-by-cycle
comparison is not relevant since failures are expected to be identified by the corre-
sponding signature at the end of the workload. This implies that the system FPGA
doesn’t need the GOLDEN-MUT in figure 4.2, saving a considerable amount of
resources.
In the Beam Test Mode of Operation, the test is never paused but executed
completely. The outputs from the design being injected are processed in a signa-
ture module and the resulting signature is then read by the computer. The way
to proceed with the fault injector is to perform blind systematic campaigns for
full coverage of registers and time, required to get a comprehensive dictionary of
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Figure 4.1: Flow chart of the proposed approach. The left branch corresponds
to the fault dictionary generation.
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faults. In future versions of the emulator, the fault dictionary should be stored in
hardware to avoid transactions with the application running on the computer.
In a radiation experiment, the SEU-MUT block corresponds to an integrated
circuit operating under radiation, so that there are no need to implement an in-
stance of the circuit in the system FPGA. The inputs for the Module Under Test
are applied using the expansion ports of the hardware emulator and so the outputs
from the circuit are read by the system FPGA. The outputs from the irradiated
circuit are then hashed and signatures recorded as in the dictionary generation.
Appendix B is related to the hardware associated to the Beam Test Mode of Oper-
ation, that together with the FTU emulator constitute the custom ATE developed











Figure 4.2: Block Diagram showing integration of the Hash Function in the clas-
sic architecture of FTUNSHADES
4.3 Fault Dictionary Generation
The methodology proposed in this thesis is intended to provide ASIC designers
with an experimental procedure to evaluate mitigation strategies in the final de-
vice, performing a real particle accelerator test. Error propagation depends on the
stimuli at the primary inputs and can only be observed and studied from the pat-
terns generated at the primary outputs. In dynamic tests, failures induced by SEE
are normally present for several cycles at the circuit output ports. This output pat-
tern depends on the nature, location and clock cycle of the fault affecting to any
internal FF of the circuit. The output data flow is completely deterministic for a
given set of input stimuli, if an unique initial logic state can be guaranteed. This
means that if the fault does not remain latent inside the circuit, there is an unique
sequence of logic values at the primary outputs (or output pattern) provoked by
the presence of the fault.
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It is clear that an output pattern is not always causally related to an unique
given single event, having place in a given location and time. Hence a 1-to-1
relation can not be always established as would be desirable. In these cases, more
than one event leads to the same output pattern and disambiguation is impossible
by only observing the circuit outputs. This effect is known as aliasing by some
authors [90]. Anyway, only a bunch of events will be sharing exactly the same
output pattern and the origin of the failure can be reduced to that number of SEE
candidates, which is a valuable information for designers.
In the presented technique, the whole stream of data coming from the circuit
outputs is hashed to generate a unique short signature in real time. Then, as long
as a given output stream is related to an internal upset, it can be related to a unique
keyword or signature. Latent, silent or masked faults will produce an error-free
data stream corresponding to a golden signature.
During fault dictionary generation, the whole stream of data coming from the
circuit outputs is digested to generate a unique short hash signature in real time.
Hashes are the keys to find in the fault dictionary the corresponding origin of the
observed error, in terms of clock cycle and affected FF.
In the real test in a particle accelerator, a hash function module is placed con-
nected to the integrated circuit outputs to compute a hash code cycle by cycle,
until the end of the workload. The final value is the signature of the corresponding
run. This procedure is repeated continuously while the device is under radiation
to get a golden hash when no faults are present, or an anomalous or faulty hash
when errors appear at the outputs.
Massive fault injection campaigns over all the registers in the design and clock
cycles in the test allow to generate fault dictionaries where the location and time of
the injected faults are labeled by the signature values, and stored in a database or
fault dictionary. The need for speeding up such comprehensive campaigns make it
necessary to use a hardware emulator to achieve the highest fault injection rates.
For this thesis, the platform for emulation FT-UNSHADES [3] has been slightly
modified to include the beam test mode of operation and the hash module. As a
mature tool, it has proven to be versatile for many works involving fault injection
in digital circuits.
Autonomous hardware emulators like [57] could be very valuable for the gen-
eration of fault dictionaries due to the high fault rates achieved in systematic cam-
paigns. For speeding up these campaigns, a hardware emulator can save the state
of the system in a given clock cycle to resume from this state with the next fault,
avoiding to execute all the previous cycles before the injection of the fault. This
feature is compatible with hash signature generation since the hash calculation
can be resumed from the last-cycle hash.
Figure 4.1 describes the proposed approach connecting the main steps in it. As
can be seen, there are two independent process flows starting from the hardware
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description or netlist of a digital design. The process to the left is the emulation
flow, and the process to the right is the experimental flow. As said before, hardware
emulation is in charge of performing massive fault injection campaigns in all the
registers of the design and in all the possible clock cycles of the test. The basic
model for fault injection is the bit-flip model. Test vectors in the middle of the flow
chart are shared for the two process flows. The fault injection campaign generates
a fault dictionary indexed by a hash value corresponding to each and every single
run.
The process to the right is the experimental work flow, starting with a silicon
device fabricated from the original HDL description or netlist of the digital de-
sign. The ATE is configured and prepared to operate in the accelerator facility to
control the target circuit, taking into consideration all the physical and electrical
constraints imposed by the beam line. ATE is in addition retrieving all the data
from the circuit under test generating in real time the hashes that are recorded in
log files.
The model used to inject faults in the design netlist is the bit-flip, correspond-
ing to the change in the logic state of a single FF. This model is appropriate for
testing soft errors affecting one or more bits due to the strike of an ionizing parti-
cle. Other physical errors can be modeled based on the bit-flip model.
The presented technique is suitable to be used for any precomputed error
model. Single Event Upset is represented in this context as a bit-flip in a FF. Single
Event Transients are modeled as a worst case where the propagated pulsed is reg-
istered by one or several FFs simultaneously. FT-UNSHADES platform supports
an extension that evaluates transients [2]. Multi Bit Upset effects can be studied
by the injection of several simultaneous bit-flip in those FFs that can be paired by
layout proximity, after a detailed study of the circuit.
The HDL implementation of the hash function is connected seamless and non-
intrusively in the work flow of FT-UNSHADES. Also, the size of the hash function
implemented in the system FPGA is negligible as can be seen in Table 3.1 for
FNV.
As commented in previous sections, the FNV hash function has 8 inputs and
generates a hash word of 32 bits. This means that, if we had a number n of 8-bit
output ports in our design, we would need to attach n FNV hash blocks in parallel
and then bring together the 32-bit output ports of each one to produce a unique
n×32-bit hash.
4.3.1 SEU Dictionaries
The fault model to generate a SEU dictionary is a single bit-flip. The most simple
fault dictionary can be generated by injecting bit-flips in each and every single FF
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in the design to be tested. Depending on the experimental conditions and tested
circuit, SEU errors can be the only soft errors appearing.
4.3.2 SET Dictionaries
SET dictionaries can be generated by defining suitable fault models for this type
of single event effects. There are some approaches like [2] using FT-UNSHADES
to analyze the capture of transients from the cone of logic. Another approach for
having fault models for SET dictionaries consists of combining the gate and regis-
ter transference levels of a circuital description, to model the capture of transients
by the sequential logic. This method for multilevel emulated-based fault injection
approach is described in [30].
4.3.3 MBU Dictionaries
Multi-Bit Upsets occur due to direct ionization by irradiation at small grazing an-
gles of incidence or by nuclear reactions at any angle by irradiation with protons,
alpha particles or neutrons. Ion track can affect several neighbor flip-flops in their
sensitive volumes flipping their logical states. A fault model for MBU consists of
injecting multiple bit-flips at the same clock cycle in neighbor flip-flops. It is then
necessary to have information about the circuit layout to define fault models for
MBU.
Figure 4.3 from [106], is a simulation on how a proton lead to MBU by a
nuclear reaction near the surface of the semiconductor.
Of course, the use of fault dictionaries other than SEU dictionaries implies the
definition of fault models, what can be a tedious work. In this context, for SET or
MBU radiation tests, it is recommendable to have high focusing of the ion beam in
order to irradiate a relatively small area to simplify the fault dictionary calculation.
4.4 Workload Suitability for Fault Diagnosis
The hashes at the end of the test vectors are recorded and post-processed to filter
and collapse identical hashes, resulting in a statistical analysis about fault alias-
ing. In fault campaigns, a first run is performed without fault injection. The golden
hash is then recorded for further comparison. All the subsequent runs in the cam-
paign having the same golden signature are marked as “harmless injection”, and
therefore not included in the fault dictionary. After removing harmless injection,
all the faults producing the same hash are brought together to form a group of
equivalence. Of course, the smaller the size of these groups the more unambigu-
ous the relation between faults and hashes is. This analysis has been performed
89
Fault Injection Campaigns
Figure 4.3: Multi Bit Upset simulation by proton irradiation, triggering a nu-
clear reaction resulting in direct ionization of several sensitive vol-
umes by an oxygen ion [106].
on 4 different designs to observe the statistics in the hash-to-fault ratios or fault
aliasing. Hence, this analysis provide a figure of merit for the quality of the test
vectors attending to fault aliasing. Some basic information about these case stud-
ies is shown in Table 4.1.
Figures 4.4 and 4.5 correspond to fault dictionaries obtained for several pro-
grams running on an implementation of the Intel 8051 processor. In this case,
faults were induced systematically on the CPU Control Unit at random clock cy-
cles. In all the cases, approximately the 85% of the faults injected were masked
or latent faults, and only the remaining 15% were visible on the primary outputs.
The fault injection campaigns consisted of 20000 runs in all the cases, which turns
to be a reasonable number of injections for representative statistics. Pie charts in
figures 4.4 and 4.5 were obtained from this 15% of observed errors. These charts
represent the aliasing in the observed errors. The number of test vectors ranges
from 166608 vectors for the Elliptical Filter program to 1364936 vectors for the
Viterbi algorithm. As can be observed, the worst case for exact diagnosis (1-to-1)
corresponds to the “Matrix Product”. In this case, almost 70% of the observed
errors are expected to be exactly diagnosed. In the other cases, this percentage is
close to 85%. Another relevant information from this charts is the percentage of
errors with 4 or more possible candidate faults, which would be desirable to be as
low as possible. Again the “Matrix Product” presents the worst case, with 28% of
errors with 4 or more candidate faults.
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Design FF RAM Test Vectors Inputs Outputs
(Kb)
INTEL 8051 2403 36 166608 / 1364936 32 32
CORDIC 1179 0 1000 19 32
SPACEWIRE 196 36 5409 29 31
JONIC 67 0 1127 5 4
Table 4.1: HDL Synthesis summary for the digital designs used for fault dictio-
nary generation
Figure 4.6 shows the corresponding results for a Cordic processor, a Spacewire
codec and JONIC, the test vehicle targeted in chapter 5. The Cordic and Spacewire
fault dictionaries were not generated covering the whole fault spectrum, and so
they are not representative of the complete fault dictionary. Nevertheless, a huge
amount of faults (100000) were randomly selected to have good statistics for these
cases (as for the Intel 8051). Close to 80% of the faults injected resulted in visible
errors for the Cordic processor. The percentage of visibility in the Spacewire codec
was 30%.
Exhaustive fault injection was performed only on JONIC, the design to be
exposed to the beam. In this case, a campaign with 70886 faults resulted in an
error visibility of 48%. The corresponding pie charts show that roughly half of the
errors at the outputs are caused by an unique fault injection in a given clock cycle
and FF, and approximately 75% of the failures are coming from three possible
faults or less in all the cases studied.
These statistical analyses provide a figure of merit for the visibility and diag-
nosability of test vectors and can be very valuable when facing a dynamic radi-
ation experiment in a particle accelerator. Fault aliasing can be used as a figure
of merit for a given workload, in such a way that a set of test vectors could be
discarded if not complies with a minimum percentage of perfectly diagnosable
failures. However, it is not the purpose of this methodology to provide the most
representative set of stimuli or test pattern as in the case of Automated Test Pattern
Generation algorithms. The statistical analysis in this section provides a figure of
merit for a set of test vectors if there are several sets available.
It is also remarkable that some of the digital designs tested in this section
(CORDIC, JONIC) are all feed-forward architectures with no internal states, mem-
ory blocks or feed-back loops. Regarding fault aliasing, feed-forward designs are
expected to be the worst case examples. Certainly, in these designs faults do not
remain in the design for too long, and outputs are expected to be quite similar
for different fault injections. The data flow from primary outputs is expected to
be more variable when faults remain in the design long time due to memories
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or feed-back loops, thus reducing aliasing, as can be observed in the Intel 8051
processor.
4.5 Remarks on This Chapter
This Chapter is crucial to understand the main contributions of this thesis. Here,
the beam test mode of operation for FT-UNSHADES has been introduced, which
is extensible to other ATEs. The generation of fault dictionaries indexed by hash
codes is an excellent way for hardware fault injectors to assist in dynamic radiation
tests of digital parts. Before moving to the accelerator facility, a fruitful work
can be done with the fault injector in relative low time (compared to the time it
takes the full setup of the beam test). The statistical analysis of fault dictionaries
provides a way to qualify different sets of test vectors for a radiation experiment.
First, attending to the visibility of the test vectors, and second, attending to the
probability to diagnose soft errors.
A number of published works about FT-UNSHADES [76, 77] have contributed
to establish the background to develop the main ideas in this chapter. Part of the
statistical analysis have been published here [70].
It is worth mentioning that, the need for massive fault injection campaigns
have fostered the development of FTU2. An introductory paper about FTU2 was
published recently [69].
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(c) Finite Impulse Response (FIR) Filter
Figure 4.4: (1/2) Failure percentage distribution attending to the number of pos-
sible faults involved for different programs running on the Intel 8051
processor. First sector to the right corresponds to failures diagnosed
without uncertainty (1 to 1). The number of possible faults involved





















Figure 4.5: (2/2) Failure percentage distribution attending to the number of pos-
sible faults involved for different programs running on the Intel 8051
processor. First sector to the right corresponds to failures diagnosed
without uncertainty (1 to 1). The number of possible faults involved
for a given failure is represented increasing clockwise up to 1 to >3.
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(a) CORDIC processor. Almost 60% of the fail-









(b) SPACEWIRE codec. More than half of the
failures are perfectly determined. Failures related









(c) JONIC test vehicle. Almost 50% of failures
can be related to a single fault.
Figure 4.6: Failure percentage distribution for different designs attending to the
number of possible faults involved. First sector to the right corre-
sponds to failures diagnosed without uncertainty (1 to 1). The num-
ber of possible faults involved for a given failure is represented in-





Experiment at the Particle
Accelerator
“Le macchine, diceva, sono effetto dell’arte, che è scimmia della natura, e di essa
riproducono non le forme ma la stessa operazione."
– Guglielmo da Baskerville, “Il nome della rosa”
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5.1 Introduction
Previous radiation experiments in particle accelerator and laser facilities like [85,
107] were always done using a reduced version of the FT-UNSHADES emulator
also known as FTUSB, which is not a fault injection tool, but a portable platform
for real testing. The problem with this platform is in the system FPGA used to
implement the design under test. In FTUSB, this FPGA is a Xilinx Spartan 3 so
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the maximum size available for the design to be tested is reduced when compared
to the Xilinx Virtex 2 in FT-UNSHADES. Moreover, the application managing
the test in FTUSB is slightly different to that in FT-UNSHADES and so, it is not
straightforward to compare signatures from the radiation experiment to that in the
fault dictionaries generated in a hardware fault injector like FT-UNSHADES.
It is worth noting that the computer and hardware emulator used for fault in-
jection in the previous chapter, are now arranged to be the ATE in the radiation
experiment described in this chapter. This way, the time it takes to prepare the
instrumentation for the accelerator test is shortened.
This chapter introduces the custom test equipment deployed in the radiation
experiments carried out for this thesis corresponding to the block ATE in the flow
chart of Figure 5.1. The ATE (in Figure 5.2) is also referred to as test fixture by
some authors [92]. Also, the experimental setup necessary for the experiments
according to the floor plan in Figure 5.3 is detailed. Later in this chapter, the
Device Under Test (JONIC) for the radiation experiment is thoroughly described.
The experiments are designed for signature analysis and so are in accordance
to Section 3.6 “Data Collection” in JESD89A where it is suggested to record fail-
ure signatures if possible.
5.2 Automatic Test Equipment
The FT-UNSHADES emulator has been slightly modified to be a hardware and
software test platform at the accelerator facility using the expansion ports in the
board, so a new in-beam mode for the tool, never exploited before, have been
developed as mentioned in the previous chapter. This way, the same test procedure
used to generate the fault dictionaries is followed during the radiation test. For
this purpose, the stimuli applied to both design replicas inside the system FPGA
are now sent through the expansion ports to the ASIC, also used to receive the
incoming signals from the radiated device. These signals are hashed in the proper
block inside the FPGA (the same used for fault injection) and the hash result
recorded in a log file.
The same set of test vectors are applied continuously while the device is un-
der radiation, with timeouts between runs. During these short timeouts, it is not
possible to block the beam so it is necessary to initialize the circuit previous to
the next run. The aim is to have representative numbers and avoid side effects like
multiple impacts.
Temperature measurement close to the device could also be measured includ-
ing extra circuitry to the testbed inside the chamber, however for the present work
it was not considered necessary. Target power consumption was measured exter-
nally with a precision amperemeter connected to the power line.
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Figure 5.1: Flow chart of the proposed approach. The right branch corresponds
to the radiation experiment.
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Figure 5.2: Automated Test Equipment (ATE) / Test Fixture.
Outputs from the target are hashed in real time in the system FPGA and
recorded to a log file (see Appendix C for an example of log file). Most of the
hashes recorded are expected to be the gold one (fault free). Anomalous hashes
can be extracted and searched in the fault dictionary for coincidences. If an anoma-
lous hash matches with one on the dictionary, the proper location and clock cycle
of the internal fault is then available.
More detailed information about extra circuitry and VHDL considerations for
the emulator are included in Appendices A and B.
5.3 Microbeam Chamber
The beam experiment was carried out at the CNA facilities [19, 73] of the Univer-
sity of Sevilla. The accelerator was the 3MV Linear Electrostatic Tandem Van der
Graaf, with ions supplied from a SNICS-II ion source. Beam track features a 90o
bending magnet and a switching magnet to select between 7 end lines including
an external beam line and a nuclear microprobe.
For high beam focusing, we used the nuclear microprobe featuring 3 quadruple
magnets close to the target vacuum chamber [74]. High focusing allows to restrict
the area of irradiation, improving the control of the experiment and the validation
of the results, as discussed later. On the other hand, focusing may help to reduce
the size of the fault dictionary by injecting only in the area of interest. Picture in
Figure 5.4 is a close view of the microprobe vacuum chamber without the sealing
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Figure 5.3: Floor plan of the experimental setup at the CNA facilities.
top plate.
A Silicon particle detector was used to measure the particle flux before placing
the target in the beam path and a microscope attached to a video cam was used to
visually establish the area of interest to be irradiated.
Once the target is placed in front of the beam line, blocking the silicon detec-
tor, it is no longer available. The flux is then measured indirectly from the X-ray
produced by the bulk Silicon atoms in the target device. For this purpose, a Si(Li)
detector is placed 135o away from the beam line. The board holding the target
device in Figure 5.5 (see Appendix B) is attached to the top plate of the vacuum
chamber so that the target device stay centered when the chamber is covered. A
pair of manual positioners allow to move precisely the target in the plane per-
pendicular to the beam line, aiming the area of interest with the assistance of the
microscope and the video cam.
5.4 Vehicle Under Test
JONIC Test Vehicle is a 130nm CMOS digital ASIC in a 40-lead DIL package
consisting of six identical instances of a custom design, sharing the input ports and
power rails. The design was conceived as a digital dummy target to be operated
under radiation with no specific functionality and designed to enhance observabil-
ity of SEE. The layout of the design is showed in Figure 5.6 and the whole die
with the six replicas is in Figure 5.7.
Following is the functional description of the test vehicle corresponding to the
block diagram of Figure 5.8. The structure to the left in Figure 5.6 is a 32bit shift
register (SR). The individual FFs are observed clearly in an array of 4x8 in the
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Figure 5.4: Vacuum chamber at the nuclear microprobe line of the 3MV Tandem
Van der Graaf Accelerator.
layout with a total size of 30x62 µm. The outputs of the 32 FFs are connected to
two identical cones of logic consisting of a matrix of XOR gates. After the cone
of logic there are 4x8-bit parallel-to-serial (PS) registers connected as seen in the
block diagram. The PS registers are loaded in parallel (dotted bus in Figure 5.8)
every 32 clock cycles, and the rest of the time are shifting a parity bit calculated
every clock cycle from the content of the SR.
The clock for the 32-bit SR is managed in such a way that it is stopped during
a clock cycle after 32 consecutive cycles of serial load, to dump data in parallel
to the PS registers through the cone of logic1. An input signal enables the PS
registers to be loaded in parallel during the cycle when the SR is frozen. The input
test vectors are built up from 4 signals: the clock and data input for the SR, and
the clock and enable signals for the PS registers.
The blue box in the block diagram of the design is a SET detector to find
transient pulses in the parity bit due to impacts on the cone of logic. Basically, it
is made by comparing the outputs from two FFs clocked in the rising and falling
edge of the clock signal respectively, to detect changes in the parity bit during a
single clock cycle. This block is out of the scope of this work, but output coming
1For the SET detector to work properly, a specific workload must be used. For arbitrary input
stimuli as in the present case study, the putput from the SET detector is meaningless.
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5.4 Vehicle Under Test
Figure 5.5: Top plate of the vacuum chamber at the nuclear microprobe line and






Figure 5.6: Layout of one of the six replicas of the circuit under test.
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Figure 5.7: JONIC. View of the target die featuring six replicas of the circuit
showed in Figure 5.6.
32bit Shift Register

















Figure 5.8: Block diagram of the design under test. See text for a detailed de-
scription.
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from it has been used for the hash calculation due to it is affected when faults
are injected in the SR. So, the 4 outputs considered for the hash calculation are
coming from the main SR, the PS registers and the SET detector. As long as the
FNV hash function needs 8 inputs, the 4 outputs from the circuit were replicated.
Putting the design in a well-known initial state is mandatory for a technique
based on signature analysis. In this case, the design has no global asynchronous
reset net to avoid unwanted global resets from glitches induced by radiation. In-
stead, a start up sequence is applied to put the circuit in a known initial state
previous to start the hash calculation.
The emulator clock frequency is twice the frequency of the design, so during
the fault injection campaign in FT-UNSHADES it is possible to choose to inject
in both halves of the design clock cycle. For this case study, a workload with
1127 emulator clock cycles is applied including the start up sequence to reset
the whole circuit. A systematic fault injection campaign covering all the FFs and
clock cycles in the workload consists of 70886 runs. For a 32-bit hash function
there are theoretically a probability of 0.5 to find one collision for 216(=65536)
messages digested2. Considering that most of the runs in the fault injection lead
to no error at the outputs, the 32-bit version of the FNV hash function is enough
to keep low the probability of collision for this case study. A fault dictionary was
obtained in few hours from FT-UNSHADES previous to the radiation experiment
at the particle accelerator.
Previous experiences and simulation works done for a 0.5 microns CMOS
technology resulted in a bit-flip threshold for the LET corresponding to approx-
imately 16 MeV Oxygen or 12 MeV Magnesium ions [87]. For this experiment
on a 0.13 microns CMOS technology, Carbon ions were accelerated to 13 MeV
to have enough LET to flip the logical state of the FFs. The flux of particles was
reduced to 130-160 counts per second (cps) to avoid TID effects during the test.
Focusing is necessary to reduce the beam exposition area, controlling exposi-
tion to better understand experimental results. Focusing capabilities of the nuclear
microprobe depend on the kinetic energy of the ion. For 13 MeV Carbon ions,
magnetic lenses at the end of the beam line are able to focus to the SR area in
Figure 5.6, this way limiting faults to this area. All the anomalous hashes detected
during the experiment should be related to faults injected in the 32-bit SR.
5.5 Signal Integrity Issues
The configuration of the automated test equipment for the accelerator experiment
includes the assessment of signal integrity issues. Remote control of the target
2Each message digested is equivalent to a run.
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Figure 5.9: Waveforms of input stimuli. A glitch is showed in the input data of
the SR.
chip introduces some electrical artifacts mainly due to cabling, the feedthrough in
the microprobe and other hardware (see Figure 5.4).
During the assembly of the ATE before moving to the test beam facility, a
complete check of performance was done including the bunch of cables, the de-
tachable feedthrough block and the PCBs that hold the DUT and interface the
emulator (See the items named “PCB adapter” in Figure 5.2 and “Internal Board”
in Figure 5.5). The final layout of these PCBs is included in appendix B. The aim
of in-room testing was to get working the complete test setup out of the beam.
In absence of radiation, everything during the test bench must run properly.
The challenge then was getting golden signatures from the DUT with 100% of
confidentiality, guaranteeing no data corruption from the instruments. The golden
signature was known from the previous fault injection campaign and also from
VHDL simulation. As can be seen, signature analysis is applied here for electronic
testing in this stage of the experiment, ensuring that all the data coming out the
DUT are valid.
The first issue relating the data channel between the emulator and the device
under test was the different voltage ratings. The FPGA banks connected to the
expansion ports in the emulator board are referenced to 3.3 V, while the DUT
core and input/output buffers are powered to 1.2 V. There are no possibility to
change the voltage reference of the output buffers for the FPGA in the emulator,
so voltage translation was considered.
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Figure 5.10: Waveforms of input stimuli. A glitch appears in the signal “ENA”
that controls the parallel load of the PS registers.
Figure 5.11: Ringing in the clock signal in the DUT side.
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5.5.1 Emulator-Side Voltage Translation
A first approach consisted of using voltage conversion at the emulator side. The
8-bit bidirectional voltage-level translator TXB0108 was used for this task, but
this device introduces too much delay in the switching, and data was corrupted
even for low bit rates (10 MHz). A suitable alternative with better switching char-
acteristics is the SN74AVC4T774.
Voltage conversion at the emulator-side implies that signals referenced to 1.2
V must travel all along the data channel. The problem in a noisy environment
is that noise margin is narrow and eventually it becomes a problem for signal
integrity. After assembling the complete ATE, the first tests of operation went
wrong, with the emulator recording signatures very different from the expected
golden signature. The main problem detected was a number of glitches in some
signals at the DUT-side. Figures 5.9 and 5.10 show two screenshots from the
oscilloscope displaying glitches in two inputs of the DUT. After a number of tests
without success, DUT-side voltage translation was considered in order to provide
wider noise margin in the data transfer.
5.5.2 DUT-Side Voltage Translation
The major concern here may be related to operation in a radiation environment.
However, focusing guarantees no ions out of the beam spot. It was not expected
a significant gamma-ray or X-ray background inside the chamber during the test
due to the low energy of the incoming ions, so extra circuitry could be placed
safely in the inner PCB for the radiation experiment.
With this configuration, signals are referenced to 3.3 V (the voltage reference
at the FPGA I/O banks in the emulator) and voltage is translated close to the DUT,
inside the microprobe chamber. The noise margin for 3.3 V signaling is wider than
1.2 V and ensures better immunity to noise. However, another problem was ob-
served immediately after the output ports of the DUT, showing no glitches but
data appearing several cycles before expected. The analog probe of the oscillo-
scope showed problems of ringing in the clock signals arriving the DUT that was
identified to be the reason for extra clock cycles, inducing anticipation in the cir-
cuit response. Ringing can be observed in Figure 5.11 for the 3.3 V clock cycle
before voltage translation to 1.2 V.
To mitigate ringing in the clock line, a resistance of 100 Ohm was placed close
to the DUT input clock terminating the line in parallel. This modification in the
PCB filtered the rapid transitions and overshooting in the clock edges. After this
little change, the test started working as expected, recording the gold signature
with no flaws. The test was run repetitively for long periods to check the proba-




Among the particle accelerators available at the CNA facilities, the most suitable
for the proposed experiment is the 3 MV linear tandem Van der Graaf accelerator.
This is a low energy accelerator used traditionally for IBA techniques. It means
that the maximum energy and ions available are not sufficient to reach the LET
values from outer space heavy ions, so the use of this accelerator is restricted to
research and pre-validation studies of components.
For radiation experiments involving soft errors, the LET threshold for the tech-
nology under study must be achievable from the cocktail of ions and energies
available. Device simulation [67] and related experiments [89] demonstrated that
the linear accelerator at the CNA facilities was able to flip the logic for a 0.5 µm
CMOS technology. Therefore, soft errors on a 130 nm CMOS technology should
be feasible in this accelerator due to a significantly lower characteristic critical
charge.
The LET threshold and complete SEU cross sections for commercial 130 nm
CMOS SRAM memory modules are obtained in [25] experimentally and by sim-
ulation. The results on this paper are applicable to our case study due to the sim-
ilarity in the technology process and scale of integration. The foundry is STMi-
croelectronics in both cases. These results can be considered as a well basis to
make an educated guess on the LET threshold value. From this work, a LET over
roughly 2 MeV·cm2/mg should be enough to flip a standard SRAM cell in the
DUT.
To achieve a LET value over the threshold, a set of simulations were carried
out in SRIM[114] over an approximated layer model of the DUT for different
projectiles. The layer model was extracted from the technical notes and datasheets
provided by the foundry (STMicroelectronics 130 nm VLSI HCMOS9 GP) and is
built up of3:
• Aluminium: 880 nm.
• Silicon Nitride: 1010 nm.
• Silicon Oxide: 5650 nm
• Si-Bulk. Silicon >500nm.
Several ion species and energies were tried following the guidelines in [74].
SRIM simulations for a Carbon ion accelerated to 13 MeV resulted on an as-
sociated LET of approximately 4.5 MeV·cm2/mg in the silicon active region as
3The exact layer stack up is confidential and only total thicknesses are provided for each
compound.
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Figure 5.12: Simulated ionizing LET profile for 13 MeV Carbon ions striking a
layered model of JONIC device.
showed in Figures 5.12 and 5.13, which is well above the estimated LET threshold
of 2 MeV. Figure 5.13 is a detail of the LET profile on the active silicon. The ver-
tical dotted line to the right is approximately the theoretical maximum collection
depth (approx. 1 µm) for a 130 nm CMOS technology, from [6]. Charge generated
deeper in the bulk silicon does not contribute to the total collected charge.
The total ionizing dose will be negligible and can be even reduced by limiting
the total fluence during the beam sessions. The relatively low LET value associ-
ated to the Carbon ion also guarantees almost non-existing displacement damage
directly related to NIEL, which is roughly 0.1% of the total energy loss [31].
13 MeV Carbon ions can be conveniently focused by the powerful magnetic
lenses in the nuclear microprobe. Moreover, soft errors are likely to occur without
physical damage or degradation on the target as predicted by SRIM simulations.
For all these considerations, 13 MeV Carbon ions were selected for the radiation
experiment.
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Figure 5.13: Detail of the ionizing LET profile in Fig. 5.12 to show direct ion-
ization in the active region of the silicon device.
5.7 Final Test Considerations
5.7.1 Multi-Bit Upset
Before the experiment, an exhaustive fault dictionary for SEU errors was gen-
erated, covering the whole circuit design. Moreover, also a fault dictionary for
MBU errors was generated in the area of the Shift Register, where the beam was
focused approximately. From the layout of the Shift Register, it is possible to con-
sider fault dictionaries including two or more bit-flips simultaneously in adjacent
FFs. Nevertheless, MBU errors are not likely to occur in our case study with 13
MeV Carbon ions at normal incidence.
For radiation experiments including the possibility of introducing tilt angles
in the beam, MBU fault dictionaries can provide hashes registered during the test
that are not present in the SEU dictionary. Figure 5.14 represents the layout of the
targeted shift register with the distribution of the FFs. The colored tiles represent
bit-flip patterns related to ions striking with a given tilt angle. The lower the tilt
angle, the higher the number of FFs to consider for MBU calculation. For exam-
ple, the orange pattern would correspond to a small grazing angle of incidence,
affecting potentially to 4 FFs in the shift register.
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Normal incidence of particles with a high cross-section for nuclear reactions
can also lead to MBU due to secondary ionization from the products of the nuclear
reaction. Again, it is not the case of 13 MeV Carbon ions.
Hardware emulators are normally able to inject more than only one fault in
a given clock cycle. FT-UNSHADES has no limit in the number of faults to be
injected simultaneously.
5.7.2 SET Errors
The combinational cone of logic in JONIC consists of 5 stages of XOR logic
gates. Referring to works on pulse induced pulse broadening effect as for exam-
ple [18, 68], only few picoseconds would add to the width of the initial voltage
pulse. Broadening is not a concern in short combinational paths for low clock
frequencies.
Voltage pulse width after the ion strike is expected to be lower than two hun-
dred of picoseconds, and following [60], the probability of this transient to be





For a pulse width of 200 ps and a clock period of 333 ns (3 Mhz), the prob-
ability of latching a SET is lower than 0.1 %. This probability (Platch) must be
multiplied by the SET cross-section and integrated for any possible pulse width to
find out the probability of having SET errors [60].
In principle, there was no necessity for a SET dictionary since DUT’s clock
frequency was very low (3 MHz) to have significant probability of having SET
errors.
5.7.3 Timing
Time dimension must be also controlled while in the beam to have a reasonable
probability of causing SEE before damage from accumulated dose appears. Dur-
ing the experiment, the workload is applied to the target device continuously to
detect errors dynamically. Depending on the ATE features, there could be time
windows during the beam time when the target is running and timeouts when the
target is not active but also receiving radiation. These timeouts are necessary to
record data or to prepare the next run. Of course, static SEE from these timeouts
must be removed during the reset sequence when a new run is underway. For the
present case study, with a single run test time of 169 µs, and a timeout of 64.6
4Considering a pulse width larger than the setup+hold times of the FF.
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Figure 5.14: Floor plan of the 32-bit Shift Register under radiation. Colored tiles
represent possible patterns for MBU fault injection in order to get
MBU fault dictionaries.
ms, the idle time represent close to 99,7% of the beam time. Supposing a rather
homogeneous beam and, for a flux of particles of around 150 cps, there are an in-
terval of approximately 6.6 ms between impacts so it is improbable to have more
than one ion striking in the same run. Indeed, it is even rare to have just one strike
while the target is running.
5.8 Remarks on This Chapter
This chapter introduces the experimental setup for the radiation test in a parti-
cle accelerator. The first challenge was to customize the FT-UNSHADES hard-
ware emulator to turn it into a test fixture. Some extra home-made hardware has
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been developed and extra VHDL code to make available the Beam Test Operation
Mode.
The 3MV Linear Electrostatic Tandem Van der Graaf accelerator was proved
capable for testing soft errors by simulation and experimentally [66, 89]. Previous
radiation experiments at the Cyclotron accelerator were also very valuable [107].
Projectile selection was done by SRIM simulation using a complete layer model
of the DUT.
The vehicle under test was designed in the Dept. of Electronics Engineering
of the University of Seville and have been fabricated in a 130 nm CMOS process.
Layout availability is not mandatory, but it helps during the setup of the experi-
ment.
Signal integrity in the communication channel with the DUT is very important
to guarantee no errors due to electronics. Transmission line termination should be
always considered, even for low frequencies (at least for the clock signal).
Finally in this chapter, a number of test recommendations are done. Particu-
larly, a work done on PIPB effect by the author of this thesis [68], is taken into




Discussion of the Results
“That’s all i have to say about that."
– Forrest Gump
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6.1 Introduction
The results discussed in this chapter, and also the soft error detection and diagnosis
methodology, which is the main contribution of this thesis, has been submitted
to the IEEE Transactions on Nuclear Sciences. The work is actually under peer
review.
6.2 Experimental Results
The experiment consisted of recording dynamically a number of logs with the
hash signatures of different runs while the DUT was under radiation. The most
of the time, the recorded signatures was the expected one or golden signature,
showing no anomalies on the outputs during the whole run. However, during the
beam time, some anomalous signatures were recorded indicating the presence of
errors at the circuit outputs. Following is an example extracted from a log file
recorded during irradiation with a flux of 130 cps:
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# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h99F16C9B
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
The hash value h2325C245 is the expected golden signature for an error-free
run, but the hash value h99F16C9B is an anomalous signature and must be found
in the fault dictionary to be validated as SEU. In such case, it is possible to classify
the error and diagnose the origin.
In fact, signature h99F16C9B is catalogued in the fault dictionary and the error
can be diagnosed. In this case, the bit-flip took place on the FF no. 30 in the SR
at the clock cycle 733 of the workload, as showed in the following extract of the
fault dictionary:
# RUN 10623
# Selected clk cycle for SEU insertion:
# 733
# Selected reg for SEU insertion:
# */REG_s30/qs
# Elapsed time: 0.031250
# hash = h99F16C9B
The same procedure is applicable to other 24 anomalous signatures obtained
dynamically in several different flux conditions to obtain the diagnostic of all
the errors that appeared during the radiation experiment. All the signatures were
perfectly determined except by one shared by 13 candidate faults. The hash code
h921B46F4 is associated in the fault dictionary to 13 different FFs flipped at the
clock cycle 1088. For the set of test vectors tried in the beam sessions, Figure 6.1
is representing the number of SEUs diagnosed in the different FFs of the 32-bit
SR. Figure 6.2 is representing the distribution of the diagnosed faults along the
workload. All the anomalous hashes detected correspond to faults affecting the
SR, this way demonstrating that the beam was perfectly focused on this region of
the die (see fig. 5.6). No errors were detected originated at the PS registers or at
the registers of the SET detector block, as they were out of the beam spot. Figure
6.3 shows the area distribution of SEU error population in the layout of the SR.
This graph suggests that the beam was not perfectly centered in the layout area of
the SR, but a little bit shifted.
In the event that the anomalous hashes were not present in the SEU-like fault




































































SEU distribution on the 32-bit SR
Figure 6.1: Chart representing the FFs affected during irradiation of the 32b
Shift Register
a different dictionary. Depending on several experimental variables like angle of
incidence, it can be interesting to generate a fault dictionary injecting MBU faults.
Also SET errors should be considered for deep submicron technologies clocked
at high frequencies.
To get full traceability of each SEU, errors can be reproduced and analyzed
cycle by cycle using the latent-damage feature of FT-UNSHADES to observe error
propagation across target circuitry.
The proposed approach has been proven to be successful determining the ori-
gin of errors observed at the outputs of the target circuit. The case study in this
thesis proves the methodology and is applicable to more complex circuits. The
unique requirement is the reset condition, since the hash must be calculated from
a well-known initial state. Time consumption for the generation of the fault dictio-
nary could be a limitation depending on the size of the design, the number of test
vectors and the performance of the fault injector. Optimizing fault injection cam-
paigns by using fast hardware emulators can definitely impact the time required
for fault dictionary generation.
Knowing the exact time and location when the fault appeared can be used for
designers to better understand the efficiency of a variety of mitigation topologies
deployed in a unique device as in [93], tested dynamically. This methodology
can also be useful when using radiation testing for the evaluation of selective
hardening techniques.
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SEU distribution on the workload
Figure 6.2: Chart representing the interval of clock cycles in the workload af-
fected during irradiation of the 32-bit Shift Register.
Using FPGAs both during the fault injection campaign and as part of the ATE
allows to imlement different hash functions adapted to the needs of the design to
be tested. Additionally, the hash function module can be tiny in comparison with
the CUT, so even powerful hash functions only require few resources from the
FPGA.
6.3 Side Effects
This section is dedicated to explain side effects during the experiment. The log
files recorded during the radiation experiment showed an unexpected double golden
signature. It can be seen in the following fragment from a log file:
...
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hC3B66675




Figure 6.3: 3D graph showing the map of faults in the 32-bit SR. The picture in
















Figure 6.4: Block diagram of the SET detector in JONIC.
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The log file recorded two different hashes (h2325C245 and hC3B66675), both
related to error-free executions of the test vectors. These two golden signatures
appear due to two different initial states of the DUT. After power up, the logic
state of each single FF in the design is unknown and so the DUT start a reset
sequence to put the system in a well known state. There is no global reset net
in the design, but a sequence of input data loaded to the shift register and the
PS registers. However, the output FF from the SET detector block, described in
Figure 6.4, is not writable and can not be initialized. This FF provide the outdet
output that is used for the hash function to generate hash values.
The SET detector block is used for hash calculation since it introduces vari-
ability in the output data flow. However, SET detection was out of the scope of
the experiment. As stated by Eq. 5.1, for SET detection higher frequencies are re-
quired in order to have a reasonable probability of having this kind of soft errors.
The idea behind the design of the SET detector block is sampling an input sig-
nal from the cone of logic at double data rate (triggering FF1 and FF2 at rising and
falling clock edges respectively). This way, it is possible to monitor data changing
whithin a clock cycle. In the event of a transient voltage excursion sampled by
the falling edge of the clock, the XOR gate after FF1 and FF2 changes from ’0’
to ’1’. This change triggers the FF3 output register. FF3 is wired in a feedback
configuration from the ’/Q’ output port.
Depending on the initial state of FF3 after power on, the resulting golden hash
codes would be #h2325C245 or #hC3B66675 as can be easily found by simula-
tion. During the beam experiment, no powering cycles were applied so it wasn’t
expected to find different gold signatures in a given log file. However, eventually
during the beam test, the golden signature swapped randomly as can be seen in
the extract of log file showed previously.
The explanation for this effect is in the timeouts between runs. As stated in
previous chapters, ions remain hitting the DUT between runs presumably inducing
static soft errors. Of course, this soft errors are removed from the design by the
reset sequence before starting a new run. However, as discussed previously, there
is no way to force a initial value in FF3. In the event of an ion striking FF1, FF2 or
FF3 during the timeouts, it would be likely to have a bit-flip in one of these FFs.
It can be seen that a bit-flip in any of these FFs leads to a change in the state of
FF3 and so in the initial state of the circuit for the next run.
The record of different golden signatures in the log file demonstrates that, even
though the beam was approximately focused to the 32-bit Shift Register area,
some ions reach the area of the SET detector. Figure 5.6 shows the proximity
between the SR and the SET detector.
This effect was not predicted before the radiation experiment, but it is easily
understood after signature analysis.
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Conclusions and Future Work
“What is not started today is never finished tomorrow."
– Johann Wolfgang von Goethe
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7.1 Conclusions of the Present Work
The primary objective of this thesis was to make hardware fault injection tech-
niques a valid method to assist in the standard radiation test work flow. Fault
injection techniques are used commonly to find vulnerabilities in the early design
stages of electronic circuits.
In this thesis, the capacity of hardware fault injectors to perform massive
fault injection campaigns in a relative short time, has been exploited to develop a
methodology based on signature analysis. Particularly, the characterization and di-
agnosis of soft errors on digital electronic circuits due to radiation induced upsets.
For signature analysis, fault injection is required in order to achieve a complete
dictionary of errors. For this task, a mature hardware emulator (FT-UNSHADES)
was used successfully with minor modifications to include a hash algorithm.
Using the techniques developed and tested in this thesis, the following objec-
tives have been reached:
• An original technique for soft error characterization. The problem with fail-
ure detection in radiation test experiments is the validation and classification
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of the observed error. The complexity inherent to particle accelerator facil-
ities and radiation setups, introduces a uncertainty in the observed effects
of radiation. The introduction of signature analysis provides a method to
guarantee the nature of the observed error. Different fault models lead to
different fault dictionaries. Theoretically, SEU, SET or MBU faults can be
recognized after checking the registered signature if a complete dictionary
was generated by fault injection.
• An original technique for fast diagnosis of observed errors. Radiation hard-
ening by design and fault mitigation techniques can benefit from exact di-
agnosis of observed errors during radiation tests. Dynamic testing of digital
components is the best way to test the robustness of an irradiated circuit
under operation. Dynamic testing makes it hard to diagnose observed errors
since outputs can be wrong for several clock cycles. Signature generation
provides a way to code failure behaviour in a single signature, simplifying
the diagnosis of the failure in terms of affected FF and instant of occurrence.
• A statistical procedure for the qualification of test vectors for radiation tests.
The selection of a set of test vectors for a radiation test is not direct. An in-
adequate set of test vectors could mask errors that, in other case, would
reveal weakness in the design. Hence, the stimuli for a radiation test have
to provide visibility to the experiment. Attending to visibility, the statisti-
cal treatment of the fault dictionaries gives the percentage of observed er-
rors. Furthermore, attending to signature aliasing, it is possible to extract
the probability of having exact diagnosis of the observed errors.
• A simple method to improve existing test fixtures. Applying signature anal-
ysis to radiation experiments requires the introduction of a signature module
in the test fixture. Platforms based on FPGA devices are particularly flex-
ible to incorporate new hardware blocks. The HDL description of a hash
function can be introduced easily to process data coming from the DUT
outputs.
The effectiveness of these contributions have been demonstrated in a real ra-
diation experiment in this thesis.
7.2 Future Work
As said in section 1.7, the optimization of the methodology introduced in this the-
sis is out of the scope of this thesis. Therefore, there is a number of improvements
and work to do regarding several aspects of the methodology.
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• A first step forward in the work developed consists of testing larger designs
in a radiation test. The drawback with large designs is in the time to get
a complete fault dictionary, since the number of required fault injections
can be huge. This can be overcome with faster emulators or by focusing on
the radiation experiment. Regarding beam focusing, it is possible to plan
a microbeam experiment to focus the ion beam on a portion of the whole
circuit layout. The fault dictionary can be then constrained to the FFs in the
area to be irradiated.
• The use of the methodology developed in this thesis is, in principle, con-
strained to digital designs with a hardware description or netlist available.
However, for Commercial Off-The-Shelf components it is possible to model
a functionally identical netlist from a similar known architecture. A future
work on this direction will show the main drawbacks in the technique when
applied to COTS. It is worth noting that, for accurate error diagnosis, it is
necessary to know the netlist of the DUT. In other case, the radiation engi-
neer has no way to assess the origin of errors.
• There is a natural extension of this work involving radiation tests of SRAM
FPGAs. When targeting these devices in a radiation test, the most suscepti-
ble elements are the configuration bits. The rate of faults in the user design
FFs is negligible and soft errors occur almost uniquely in the configuration
memory. For this reason, it is common in SRAM FPGA devices a process
known as scrubbing. It consists of a periodic partial or total reconfiguration
of the FPGA to overwrite corrupted bits. Before performing scrubbing, it is
possible to readback the configuration bits. Data can be then processed to
have a signature corresponding to the configuration memory. This way, sig-
nature analysis can be applied to the whole configuration memory or only to
few frames. With this information, it would be possible to selectively apply
correction to the configuration memory.
• The forthcoming platform FTU2 will be a perfect test bench for the method-
ology developed in this thesis. The new hardware emulator features an au-
tonomous mode to speed-up massive fault injection campaigns. In this plat-
form, a complete process of optimization will be done to test more complex
designs.
• There are still a number of tests of feasibility before signature analysis ap-
plied to dynamic radiation experiments on integrated circuits becomes in-
dustrialized. Outputs from the DUT are generally accesible to the observer.
Therefore, as a first upgrade, actual text fixtures/ATEs can be equipped with
a signature module to hash data coming from the DUT. All runs in the beam
123
Conclusions and Future Work
line can be then recorded for future analysis. A second step would consist
of acquiring a hardware emulator for the generation of fault dictionaries.
Hardware emulators are based mostly in FPGAs and are easily customiz-






VHDL Considerations for Turning
FT-UNSHADES into an ATE
This appendix is a brief guide outlining the necessary changes in the FT-UNSHADES
emulator firmware to make it available the Beam Test Mode of Operation de-
scribed in section 4.2. Changes are related to files ftunshades.vhd, ftunshades.ucf
and debug_controller.vhd. The file top_hash_FNV.vhd1 in Appendix D must be
included to the Xilinx ISE project “Design for Test Environment (DTE)”.
• ftunshades.vhd. This module have to instantiate as much FNV blocks as
necessary, depending on the number of output ports in the MUT instance.
Some output and input ports must be added to the top entity to send stimuli
and capture the outputs from the irradiated device. It is necessary to provide
an input port to switch between beam test or fault injection modes of op-
eration. Depending on this mode, the FNV block is connected to either top
entity input ports (radiation test) or SEU-MUT instance output ports (fault
dictionary generation).
• ftunshades.ucf. The output ports added to the top instance in ftunshades.vhd
must be connected to the corresponding FPGA pin. These pins must be
connected to the expansion socket in the board.
• debug_controller.vhd. Normal operation of the fault injector implies stop-
ping the run when an error is detected at the outputs. The only change to
do in this module allows the emulator to run freely until the end of the test
vectors, whenever an error is detected or not. This way the complete data
flow from the outputs is hashed. For this purpose, the signal monitor_msk
must be initialized to 0.
1This entity is the corresponding to the FNV hash function. Other hash functions will require
the corresponding VHDL entity.
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PCB Designs for the Microprobe
End-Line
This appendix describes the functionality of the extra hardware required for the
experiment at the nuclear microprobe.
A testbed PCB is required as sample holder to attach the DUT. This board fea-
tures a 40-lead Zero Insertion Force (ZIF) socket for JONIC. Voltage translation is
achieved by means of 4 SN74AVC4T774 voltage shifter in a SOIC package. Two
connectors with 20-pins are placed in one side for connecting communication and
power cables. A small window (white rectangle in figures B.1 and B.2) was cut
in the middle of the board to measure beam fluence. For this purpose, a silicon
detector was placed in front of the beam, in the vacuum chamber. After this mea-
sure, the sample holder is shifted upwards to put the silicon die in the way of the
beam.
A PCB adapter is required to be attached to the emulator board. The purpose
of this board is to provide a pair of sockets for a bunch of flying cables to the
feedthrough in the vacuum chamber. This board also features a voltage regulator
to get a 1.2 V power source from the 3.3 V supplied by the emulator board. The
1.2 V power source supplies current to the DUT and SN74AVC4T774 integrated
circuits inside the vacuum chamber.
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Figure B.1: Top layer of the testbed holding the DUT inside the microprobe’s
vacuum chamber. Not to scale.
Figure B.2: Bottom layer of the testbed holding the DUT inside the micro-
probe’s vacuum chamber. Not to scale.
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Figure B.3: Top layer of the pcb adapter for FT-UNSHADES connection to the
microprobe’s hermetically-sealed feedthrough. Not to scale.
Figure B.4: Bottom layer of the pcb adapter for FT-UNSHADES connection to
the microprobe’s hermetically-sealed feedthrough. Not to scale.
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APPENDIX C
Log Files from Radiation
Experiments
This appendix is a fragment from a log file generated during radiation experiments
at the CNA. Here, the faulty hashes different to the expected one are h921B46F4,
h0A39E3EA, h9C236547 and hB357EF41.
# FTUnshades Test aNalysis Tools
# Release version: 2.3.2
# Build Date: Sep 19 2009
# AICIA-GIE
# Date: 10/26/2011 18:11:46
#
# Comm port successfully opened:




set directory="C:\Documents and Settings\RadUS-1\Desktop\b-Microprobe_130nm\dte"
set vectfile=ftunshades_memory_coe2_FULL.dat
loadbit
# Design name: ftunshades_top.ncd
# Design date: 2011/09/27, 13:23:08
# Bitfile device type: 2v3000ff1152
# File sent: 1313222 Bytes
loadll
loadvect
# Loading test vectors











# Starting function definition (ENDF to terminates)
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# hash = h2325C245
ionbeam
# hash = h2325C245
repeat 700 ionbeam
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
..................
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h921B46F4 ***Failure detected!***
# hash = h2325C245
..................
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h0A39E3EA ***Failure detected!***
# hash = hC3B66675
..................
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h9C236547 ***Failure detected!***
# hash = h2325C245
..................
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = h2325C245
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hB357EF41 ***Failure detected!***
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hC3B66675
..................
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hC3B66675
# hash = hC3B66675
quit
# Comm port succesfully closed
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-- hash = offset_basis
-- for each octet_of_data to be hashed
-- hash = hash * FNV_prime




Port ( clk : in STD_LOGIC;
reset_n : in STD_LOGIC;
message_in : in STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (7 downto 0);
hash : out STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (31 downto 0));
end top_hash_FNV;
architecture Behavioral of top_hash_FNV is
signal offset_basis, FNV_prime,i_hash_0, i_hash_1, n_hash_3 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (31 downto 0);
--signal i_hash_1 : STD_LOGIC_VECTOR (63 downto 0);







i_hash_1(31 downto 8) <= i_hash_0(31 downto 8);
i_hash_1(7 downto 0) <= i_hash_0(7 downto 0) XOR message_in;
i_hash_2 <= i_hash_1*FNV_prime;




VHDL Entity for FNV
--i_hash_2 <= i_hash_1(31 downto 0);
--n_hash_3(31 downto 8) <= i_hash_2(31 downto 8);
--n_hash_3(7 downto 0) <= i_hash_2(7 downto 0) XOR message_in;
sync: process (clk,reset_n)
begin
if reset_n = ’0’ then
hash <= (others=>’0’);
i_hash_0 <= offset_basis;








VHDL Package for RIPEMD-160
--Package File for RIPEMD_160 Core
--
-- Purpose: This package defines supplemental types, subtypes,
-- constants, and functions
--
-- Notes: All values for constants and definitions are taken from the paper:
--"RIPEMD-160, a strengthened version of RIPEMD",






-- *********************START PACKAGE DECLARATION***********************
package RIPEMD_160 is
-- TYPES
type block_in is array (15 downto 0) of std_logic_vector (31 downto 0);
type md_words is array (4 downto 0) of std_logic_vector (31 downto 0);
type array_of_integers is array (15 downto 0) of integer range 0 to 15;
-- CONSTANTS
-- LEFT
constant K_LEFT_1 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := (others => ’0’);
constant K_LEFT_2 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := x"5A827999";
constant K_LEFT_3 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := x"6ED9EBA1";
constant K_LEFT_4 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := x"8F1BBCDC";
constant K_LEFT_5 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := x"A953FD4E";
-- RIGHT
constant K_RIGHT_1 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := x"50A28BE6";
constant K_RIGHT_2 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := x"5C4DD124";
constant K_RIGHT_3 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := x"6D703EF3";
constant K_RIGHT_4 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := x"7A6D76E9";
constant K_RIGHT_5 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := (others => ’0’);
-- INITIAL VALUES
constant H0 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := x"67452301";
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constant H1 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := x"EFCDAB89";
constant H2 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := x"98BADCFE";
constant H3 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := x"10325476";
constant H4 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := x"C3D2E1F0";
-- ROL STEPS
constant rol_round1_a :
array_of_integers := (11, 14, 15, 12, 5, 8, 7, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 6, 7, 9, 8);
constant rol_round2_a :
array_of_integers := ( 7, 6, 8, 13,11, 9, 7,15, 7, 12, 15, 9,11, 7,13,12);
constant rol_round3_a :
array_of_integers := (11, 13, 6, 7,14, 9,13,15, 14, 8, 13, 6, 5,12, 7, 5);
constant rol_round4_a :
array_of_integers := (11, 12, 14, 15,14,15, 9, 8, 9, 14, 5, 6, 8, 6, 5,12);
constant rol_round5_a :
array_of_integers := ( 9, 15, 5, 11, 6, 8,13,12, 5, 12, 13, 14,11, 8, 5, 6);
constant rol_round1_b :
array_of_integers := ( 8, 9, 9, 11,13,15,15, 5, 7, 7, 8, 11,14,14,12, 6);
constant rol_round2_b :
array_of_integers := ( 9, 13, 15, 7,12, 8, 9,11, 7, 7, 12, 7, 6,15,13,11);
constant rol_round3_b :
array_of_integers := ( 9, 7, 15, 11, 8, 6, 6,14, 12, 13, 5, 14,13,13, 7, 5);
constant rol_round4_b :
array_of_integers := (15, 5, 8, 11,14,14, 6,14, 6, 9, 12, 9,12, 5,15, 8);
constant rol_round5_b :
array_of_integers := ( 8, 5, 12, 9,12, 5,14, 6, 8, 13, 6, 5,15,13,11,11);
-- PERMUTATION FUNCTIONS
function PERMUTATION_RHO (constant i : in integer)
return integer;
function PERMUTATION_PI (constant i : in integer)
return integer;
-- BOOLEAN FUNCTIONS
function BOOLFUNCT_1 ( signal X : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Y : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Z : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0))
return std_logic_vector;
function BOOLFUNCT_2 ( signal X : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Y : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Z : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0))
return std_logic_vector;
function BOOLFUNCT_3 ( signal X : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Y : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Z : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0))
return std_logic_vector;
function BOOLFUNCT_4 ( signal X : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Y : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Z : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0))
return std_logic_vector;
function BOOLFUNCT_5 ( signal X : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Y : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);




function PERMUT_BLOCK ( signal input : in block_in;
signal permut_sel : in std_logic)
return block_in;
end RIPEMD_160;
-- *********************END PACKAGE DECLARATION***********************
-- *********************START PACKAGE BODY****************************
package body RIPEMD_160 is
-- PERMUTATIONS




when 0 => return 7;
when 1 => return 4;
when 2 => return 13;
when 3 => return 1;
when 4 => return 10;
when 5 => return 6;
when 6 => return 15;
when 7 => return 3;
when 8 => return 12;
when 9 => return 0;
when 10 => return 9;
when 11 => return 5;
when 12 => return 2;
when 13 => return 14;
when 14 => return 11;
when 15 => return 8;
when others => return 16;
end case;
end PERMUTATION_RHO;
function PERMUTATION_PI (constant i : in integer)
return integer is
begin
return (9*i + 5) mod 16;
end PERMUTATION_PI;
-- FUNCTIONS
function BOOLFUNCT_1 ( signal X : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Y : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Z : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0))
return std_logic_vector is
begin
return X XOR Y XOR Z;
end BOOLFUNCT_1;
function BOOLFUNCT_2 ( signal X : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Y : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Z : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0))
return std_logic_vector is
begin
return (X AND Y) OR (NOT X AND Z);
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end BOOLFUNCT_2;
function BOOLFUNCT_3 ( signal X : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Y : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Z : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0))
return std_logic_vector is
begin
return (X OR NOT Y) XOR Z;
end BOOLFUNCT_3;
function BOOLFUNCT_4 ( signal X : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Y : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Z : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0))
return std_logic_vector is
begin
return (X AND Z) OR (Y AND NOT Z);
end BOOLFUNCT_4;
function BOOLFUNCT_5 ( signal X : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Y : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0);
signal Z : in std_logic_vector(31 downto 0))
return std_logic_vector is
begin
return X XOR (Y OR NOT Z);
end BOOLFUNCT_5;
function PERMUT_BLOCK ( signal input : in block_in;
signal permut_sel : in std_logic)
return block_in is
variable aux : block_in;
begin
if permut_sel = ’0’ then





for i in 0 to 15 loop






-- *********************END PACKAGE BODY******************************








-- Uncomment the following library declaration if instantiating







k : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0) := K_LEFT_1;
rol_round: array_of_integers := rol_round1_a
);
port(
clk : in std_logic;
reset_n : in std_logic;
--input block with 16 32-bit words and input message digest with 5 32-bit words.





input : in block_in;
md_in : in md_words;
count16 : in integer range 0 to 15;
perm_sel : in std_logic;
-- output block with PERMUTED 16 32-bit words and output message digest with 5 32-bit words.





output : out block_in;
md_out : out md_words
);
end core_block;
architecture behavioral of core_block is
signal p_md_out : md_words;
signal aux1, aux2, aux3 : std_logic_vector(31 downto 0); -- aux signals for b_t calculation




--b_t <= e_t-1 + (ft(bt-1,ct-1, dt-1) +a_t-1 + Xi + Kj) rol s
aux1 <= BOOLFUNCT_1 (md_in(1), md_in(2), md_in(3));
aux2 <= (input(count16) + k) + md_in(0);
aux3 <= aux1 + aux2;
aux4 <= to_bitvector(aux3) rol rol_round(count16);
p_md_out(1) <= md_in(4) + to_stdlogicvector(aux4);
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--c_t <= b_t-1
p_md_out(2) <= md_in(1);
--d_t <= c_t-1 rol 10
p_md_out(3) <= to_stdlogicvector(to_bitvector(md_in(2)) rol 10);
--e_t <= d_t-1
p_md_out(4) <= md_in(3);
async : process (input, perm_sel)
begin
if perm_sel=’0’ then









sync : process (reset_n, clk)
begin
if (reset_n=’0’) then
for i in 0 to 4 loop
md_out(i) <= (others=>’0’);
end loop;
elsif (clk’event and clk=’1’) then
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